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(WHAT WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK 
ABOUT) JUDICIAL TEMPERAMENT 
TERRY A. MARONEY* 
Abstract: Judicial temperament is simultaneously the thing we think all judges 
must have and the thing that no one can quite put a finger on. Extant accounts are 
scattered and thin, and either present a laundry list of desirable judicial qualities 
without articulating what (if anything) unifies the list or treat temperament as a 
fundamentally mysterious quality that a judge either does or does not have. Rest-
ing so much—selection, evaluation, discipline, even removal—on such an inde-
terminate concept is intellectually and practically intolerable. Polarized debates 
over Justice Kavanaugh’s fitness to sit on the Supreme Court made clear just how 
badly we need a common vocabulary to guide our discourse on judicial temper-
ament. This Article—the first extended scholarly treatment of the topic—posits 
that, because judicial temperament is a psychological construct, we ought to draw 
upon psychology to understand it. It therefore taps a deep well of scientific re-
search to construct a new psycho-legal theory of judicial temperament. It con-
ceives judicial temperament as a deep-seated, relatively stable set of specific per-
sonal traits—separable from intellect, training, and ideology—that, in dialectic 
with specific judicial environments and the predictable demands of judging, drive 
behaviors that affect how justice is delivered and perceived. The critical trait di-
mensions of a judge’s temperament are positive emotionality, negative emotion-
ality, kindness, and self-regulation. The combination of these traits determines 
how well or poorly her temperament will fit with any given judicial assignment. 
Although judicial temperament is somewhat malleable, potential for change is 
constrained. This scientifically grounded theory shows why some seldom-
mentioned attributes—like courage—are temperamental, and other commonly-
cited ones—such as commitments to equality and diversity—are not. This Article 
provides a principled alternative to the folk-wisdom manner in which judicial 
temperament traditionally has been defined and assessed. Setting the theoretical 
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terms for empirical testing of its claims—and with the potential to transform pro-
cesses for judicial selection, evaluation, and support—the psycho-legal theory 
posited here shows what we should be talking about when we talk about judicial 
temperament.  
INTRODUCTION 
[I]t seems to me that temperament is the key to everything else that one 
does on the bench.1 
Elusive as it is important, judicial temperament is notoriously hard to de-
fine.2 
 
The 2018 nomination of Justice Brett Kavanaugh to the U.S. Supreme 
Court sparked the most significant public debate over judicial temperament in 
modern history. After his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, a 
large and diverse group of detractors—including several thousand law profes-
sors—declared that his unprecedented displays of anger, discourtesy, and parti-
sanship at that hearing revealed Kavanaugh to be temperamentally unfit.3 Sup-
porters (including Kavanaugh himself, writing in his own defense) declared the 
opposite, and asserted that his behavior, though unusual, was appropriate for 
one who believed himself to be so unfairly accused, and pointed to his many 
years on the D.C. Circuit without a single temperamental complaint.4 
Tempests pass. Justice Kavanaugh was confirmed; the temperamental de-
bate moved aside to await the next controversy; and we are, by and large, none 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments: Confirmation of Appointees to the Federal 
Judiciary Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 41 (1997) [hereinafter Confirmation 
Hearings I], https://archive.org/details/confirmationhear973unit/page/40/mode/2up [https://perma.cc/
NT49-PGRE] (statement of Hon. Jeremy Fogel, nominee for the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of California). 
 2 JEFFREY ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT: THE PERSONALITIES AND RIVALRIES THAT DEFINED 
AMERICA 6–7 (2006). 
 3 Opinion, The Senate Should Not Confirm Kavanaugh: Signed, 2,400+ Law Professors, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/03/opinion/kavanaugh-law-
professors-letter.html [https://perma.cc/K32T-4794]; see Ross K. Baker, Opinion, Even with Jeff 
Flake’s FBI Investigation, Brett Kavanaugh Is Unfit to Serve, USA TODAY (Sept. 30, 2018), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/09/28/brett-kavanaugh-s…committee-vote-nomination-
christine-blasey-ford-column/1454562002/ [https://perma.cc/66AQ-XJTK] (“Kavanaugh was not 
simply angry; he was unhinged.”). 
 4 Orrin Hatch, Opinion, Brett Kavanaugh’s Righteous Anger, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 2, 2018), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/brett-kavanaughs-righteous-anger-1538519713 [https://perma.cc/YT53-4H4B]; 
Brett M. Kavanaugh, Opinion, I Am an Independent, Impartial Judge, WALL ST. J. (last updated Oct. 
4, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/i-am-an-independent-impartial-judge-1538695822 [https://
perma.cc/RQ75-WVJ8]; Rachel Ventresca, Ken Starr: Kavanaugh’s Reputation Is ‘Unblemished,’ CNN 
(Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/05/politics/ken-starr-kavanaugh-op-ed-cnntv/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/3TUR-2YCT]. 
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the wiser. For all the heat thrown off, we remain at best marginally more en-
lightened about what judicial temperament is, what function it serves, and how 
it can be discerned. This narrative trajectory is not new. It is time for that tra-
jectory to change. 
Judicial temperament is simultaneously the thing we think all judges must 
have and the thing that no one can quite put a finger on. And yet being per-
ceived as having a good temperament can get a judge confirmed or elevated; a 
perception of bad temperament can stop her at the gate, or, if she already is 
serving, get her reprimanded or removed from the bench.5 Indeed, long before 
the Kavanaugh moment, former Senator Joseph Biden stated that in evaluating 
federal court nominees he and his colleagues “worry . . . most [of all] about 
temperament.”6 It is intellectually and practically intolerable to have so much 
rest on so indeterminate a concept. If this key ingredient of judicial fitness re-
mains as “[e]lusive as it is important,” it will remain a cipher in which one sees 
what one wants, in whose lack one sees what one fears.7 We need to know 
what we are talking about when we are talking about judicial temperament. 
It is not that people have not tried to wrangle the concept of judicial tem-
perament; they have. Such efforts, however, are scattered, relatively thin, and 
tend to follow one of two approaches. The first approach is to present a laun-
dry list of desirable judicial qualities and behaviors without articulating what, 
if anything, unifies the list.8 The second approach, in contrast, treats judicial 
temperament as a fundamentally mysterious quality that one either has or does 
not have.9 Both approaches do a deep disservice to a critical measure of judi-
cial fitness. 
The list-of-good-things approach, for its part, is unduly capacious. Con-
sider this sweeping concept offered by the prominent legal commentator Jef-
frey Rosen, who wrote that temperament embraces “personality, character, up-
                                                                                                                           
 5 William G. Ross, The Questioning of Lower Federal Court Nominees During the Senate Con-
firmation Process, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 119, 131 (2001) [hereinafter Ross, Questioning] 
(describing how U.S. District Court nominee Frederica Massiah-Jackson’s nomination was withdrawn 
after temperament questions were raised—for example, by a sidebar in which she told a lawyer to 
“shut your fucking mouth” and another instance in which she stated, “I don’t give a fuck”).  
 6 Confirmation Hearings I, supra note 1, at 667 (statement of Sen. Biden); see Edward J. Devitt, 
Ten Commandments for the New Judge, 65 AM. BAR ASS’N J. 574, 574 (1979) (quoting a former lord 
chancellor of Great Britain as saying, “a kindly and patient man who is not a profound lawyer will 
make a far better judge than an ill-tempered genius”) (ellipses omitted).  
 7 ROSEN, supra note 2, at 6; see Sheldon Goldman, Selecting Lower Court Federal Judges on the 
Basis of Their Policy Views, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 729, 741 (2008) (describing judicial temperament as a 
“vague” concept); Larry W. Yackle, Choosing Judges the Democratic Way, 69 B.U. L. REV. 273, 
307–09 (1989) (characterizing the notion of judicial temperament as “unruly” in comparison to quali-
fications such as “integrity, intelligence, education, experience, [and] stamina”). 
 8 See infra notes 10–12 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 13–16 and accompanying text. 
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bringing and education, formative career experiences, work habits, and behav-
ior when interacting with others.”10 We see similar sweep (and only partial 
overlap) in the definition of temperament used by the influential American Bar 
Association (ABA) Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary (ABA Stand-
ing Committee): “compassion, decisiveness, open-mindedness, courtesy, pa-
tience, freedom from bias and commitment to equal justice under the law.”11 
Other nominations for the category include humility, collegiality, wit, pragma-
tism, likability, “the capacity and inclination to treat litigants as equals,” sensi-
tivity to racial and gender issues, not being addicted to drugs or alcohol, and 
absence of a criminal record.12 
A concept that devolves to a highly diverse list of attributes that may or 
may not relate to one another lacks analytic precision. It provides us inade-
quate tools with which to distinguish one person from another and fails to re-
flect the reasons for doing so. We may as well ask whether the person is, or 
would be, a “good judge.” 
It is no surprise, then, that the second approach utilizes this exact method, 
which suffers not from too much diverse content but from few descriptors at 
all. Without clear parameters upon which to rely, those asked to opine about an 
actual or potential judge’s temperament typically fall back on a thumbs-up-or-
down. Common among the assessments of now-Justice Elena Kagan, for ex-
ample, was this comment: “[h]er temperament is splendid.”13 The late Justice 
Antonin Scalia once offered an opposing but equally conclusory self-
                                                                                                                           
 10 ROSEN, supra note 2, at 8. 
 11 AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDING COMM. ON FED. JUDICIARY, WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT 
WORKS 3 (2017) [hereinafter HOW IT WORKS]. Many state standards echo this language. See, e.g., 
AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDING COMM. ON FED. JUDICIAL INDEP., STANDARDS ON JUDICIAL STATE SE-
LECTION 7 (2000); UTAH STATE COURTS, MANUAL OF PROCEDURES FOR JUSTICE COURT NOMINAT-
ING COMMISSIONS 19–20 (2016) (defining judicial temperament as “common sense, compassion, 
decisiveness, firmness, humility, open-mindedness, patience, tact and understanding”); see also Yack-
le, supra note 7, at 307 (“[T]he genuine content of these ‘qualifications’ begs for explanation.”). 
 12 Yackle, supra note 7, at 309 (contemplating that judicial temperament might refer to prudence, 
Solomonic justice, or capacity to “keep the morally equivalent interests of all citizens in view”); see 
James J. Alfini & Jarrett Gable, The Role of the Organized Bar in State Judicial Selection Reform: 
The Year 2000 Standards, 106 DICK. L. REV. 683, 704 (2002) (outlining the argued characteristics of 
judicial temperament); William G. Ross, The Functions, Roles, and Duties of the Senate in the Su-
preme Court Appointment Process, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 633, 650 (1987) [hereinafter Ross, 
Functions, Roles, and Duties] (quoting Laurence Tribe); Ross, Questioning, supra note 5, at 131; 
Jeffrey S. Sutton, A Review of Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think (2008), 108 MICH. L. REV. 859, 
875 (2010) (book review) (defining temperament as “[o]pen-mindedness, not taking oneself too seri-
ously, wit, self-awareness, humility, being a generous and respectful colleague, and being willing to 
work at getting it right . . . as Posner (and I) would agree”).  
 13 The Nomination of Elena Kagan to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United 
States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. of the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 572 (2010) (statement of Kim J. 
Askew, Chair, Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary, American Bar Association, quoting 
questionnaire respondent).  
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assessment. Asked, “Is there such thing as an ideal judicial temperament, and if 
so, what is it?” he replied, “If there is one, I don’t have it.”14 
With no clear criteria to distinguish splendid from bad, or either pole 
from the points in between, the utility of the concept is difficult to discern. The 
concept could even have negative utility. Because of its murkiness, “judicial 
temperament often has been a smoke screen for other objections to a nomi-
nee’s candidacy.”15 When Louis Brandeis was nominated to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, for example, the New York Sun called him “utterly and even ridiculously 
unfit,” and a group of “prominent Bostonians, including the president of Har-
vard, signed a petition” attacking his temperament.16 That accusation now 
seems wildly off base in light of the reverence with which many now regard 
both Brandeis the man and Brandeis the judge. The objection was likely moti-
vated by ideology, politics, and anti-Semitism.17 Some may make a similar 
critique today by asserting that among the strongest predictors of whether one 
criticized or defended Kavanaugh’s temperament was the extent to which one 
was antagonistic to or aligned with his ideology. 
Politics can thus infect temperament-talk, but it can also shed light on this 
concept. The 2016 presidential campaign of Donald Trump sparked its own 
significant public discourse on temperament.18 Trump’s detractors uniformly 
attacked his temperamental fitness to be president19 by complaining about 
“impulsivity,” “lack of restraint,” reactivity when taunted, and love of “creat-
                                                                                                                           
 14 Email from Alexander Boni-Saenz, Assistant Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law, to au-
thor (Sept. 9, 2015, 6:48 PM) (on file with author) (recounting public exchange from February 13, 
2012, between Professor Boni-Saenz and Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia).  
 15 Ross, Functions, Roles, and Duties, supra note 12, at 649; see William G. Ross, Participation 
by the Public in the Federal Judicial Selection Process, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1, 34–37, 65 (1990) [here-
inafter Ross, Participation] (illustrating how personal ideology can be used to assess nominees under 
the guise of objective criteria).  
 16 Ross, Participation, supra note 15, at 7; see Ross, Functions, Roles, and Duties, supra note 12, 
at 649 (providing examples of judicial temperament being used to signify ideology or specific beliefs 
and values, such as racism).  
 17 Ross, Functions, Roles, and Duties, supra note 12, at 649 n.84. 
 18 Indeed, the sudden public focus on temperament calls to mind the sudden public focus on “em-
pathy” occasioned by President Obama’s nomination of Justice Sonia Sotomayor. Terry A. Maroney, 
The Persistent Cultural Script of Judicial Dispassion, 99 CAL. L. REV. 629, 631 (2011); Peter Baker, 
In Court Nominees, Is Obama Looking for Empathy by Another Name?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2010), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/26/us/politics/26memo.html [https://perma.cc/MWY6-KX5A]. 
 19 See, e.g., John Kelly, From Jefferson to Donald Trump: A Brief History of Presidential “Tem-
perament,” SLATE (Aug. 15, 2016), http://www.slate.com/blogs/lexicon_valley/2016/08/15/from_
jefferson_to_donald_trump_a_brief_history_of_presidential_temperament.html [https://perma.cc/T37P-
URNM]; Dan P. McAdams, The Mind of Donald Trump, THE ATLANTIC (June 2016), https://www.
theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/the-mind-of-donald-trump/480771/ [https://perma.cc/ZD36-
ENXP]. 
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ing disorder.”20 The concern was not, however, a cleanly partisan one. Even his 
supporters were nervous. Trump’s temperament was their single biggest wor-
ry.21 That rare bipartisan convergence evidenced a baseline, shared belief that 
some clusters of durable personal traits make individuals more or less suited to 
particular positions of authority. These clusters are distinct from other qualifi-
cations for those positions of authority, such as adequate and relevant training. 
They also are distinct from the ideological orientations that different segments 
of the populace may prefer or not prefer when filling those positions. Whether 
we are talking about judges or other government officials, then, we are trying 
to capture something elemental about the human being. In order to predict how 
he or she will act in a specific set of circumstances, we are trying to get a sense 
of what he or she is like.22 
So far, so good. But this episode in American political history further 
demonstrates how elastic the concept of temperament can be. During the 2016 
campaign, Trump declared temperament to be his “strongest asset, maybe by 
far.”23 He characterized his temperament as a “winning” one, that is, consisting 
of knowing “how to win”—not a quality commonly seen on any temperamental 
inventory, diverse though they are.24 In a statement with strong parallels to the 
judicial context, a prominent commentator observed that “a president’s temper-
ament is his most important quality and it is the hardest to measure in the candi-
dates.”25 Like “leadership,” “character,” and “values,” the concept—whether 
applied to executive officials or judges—can “get shapeless pretty fast.”26 
                                                                                                                           
 20 Peter Wehner, Opinion, Why I Cannot Fall in Line Behind Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/21/opinion/sunday/why-i-cannot-fall-in-line-behind-trump.html 
[https://perma.cc/CD39-P3JV]; see Adam Howard, Trump’s Mental State Is Becoming a Campaign 
Talking Point, NBC NEWS (Aug. 2, 2016), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/trump-s-mental-
state-becoming-campaign-talking-point-n621556 [https://perma.cc/LJS7-GVXZ]. 
 21 According to a pre-election Pew survey, 34% of Trump supporters worried about his tempera-
ment. PEW RESEARCH CTR., IN THEIR OWN WORDS: WHY VOTERS SUPPORT AND HAVE CONCERNS 
ABOUT—CLINTON AND TRUMP 2 (2016), https://www.people-press.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/
4/2016/09/09-21-16-campaign-release.pdf [https://perma.cc/J94W-7D65]. One opined that Trump was 
like a “temperamental child saying anything in an attempt to get what he wants.” Id. Clinton support-
ers voiced no concerns about her temperament; their greatest worry was trustworthiness. Id. at 3.  
 22 CHARLES S. CARVER & MICHAEL F. SCHEIER, PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 37 (7th ed. 
2012). 
 23 Katie Zezima, Trump: My Strongest Asset ‘Is My Temperament,’ WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/09/27/trump-my-strongest-asset-is-my-
temperament/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.64b851b72659 [https://perma.cc/948E-2ZQ5]. 
 24 Id. 
 25 John Dickerson, How to Measure for a President, SLATE (Oct. 1, 2012), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/politics/features/2012/how_to_measure_a_president_/how_to_measure_
for_a_president_temperament_is_a_president_s_most_important_attribute_and_the_hardest_to_
examine_.html [https://perma.cc/23M3-PMDJ] (explaining how words like temperament are “used by 
politicians to critique their opponent without having to explain exactly what they mean”). It is a fair 
question whether we require different temperaments of executive officials and judges. Although Doris 
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Our concept of judicial temperament need not, and should not, remain 
simultaneously so vital and yet so shapeless. This Article seeks to articulate 
judicial temperament’s theoretical core and, in so doing, to fundamentally re-
orient how we think and talk about it. It posits that, because judicial tempera-
ment is a psychological construct, we ought to use psychology to understand it. 
The psycho-legal theory of judicial temperament offered by this Article pro-
poses that we ought to think of judicial temperament as a deep-seated, relative-
ly stable set of specific personal traits—separable from intellect, training, and 
ideology—that, in dialectic with judicial environments and the predictable de-
mands of judging, drive behaviors that we may deem desirable or undesirable 
according to the dominant normative expectations of our era. This way of 
thinking about judicial temperament synergizes with how our sister discipline 
of psychology conceptualizes human temperament. The psycho-legal theory 
offers a sharper notion of how judicial temperament operates structurally and 
of what it consists substantively. 
This Article represents the first substantial scholarly exploration of judi-
cial temperament, and the first of any length to recruit psychological insights. 
Part I offers an overview of extant notions of judicial temperament, particular-
ly the deep-rooted idea that the good judge is characterized, in part, by highly 
personal, non-intellectual traits.27 It echoes a philosophical tradition in which 
moral virtues—defined by Aristotle as temperance, justice, prudence, and forti-
tude—are distinguished from intellectual ones.28 Indeed, some centuries after 
Aristotle, Senator Lindsey Graham, when questioning Neil Gorsuch at his con-
firmation hearing for the Tenth Circuit, emphasized that “being a judge is more 
than being smart.”29 To predict who will be a good judge, “you have got to un-
derstand people underneath.”30 This Part examines how we have attempted to 
specify both the desired qualities that lie underneath and the behaviors those 
                                                                                                                           
Kearns Goodwin, for one, suggests there is something unique about presidential temperament, her 
account bears striking overlap with commonly cited aspects of judicial temperament. Peter Grier, 
Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton, and the Question of Temperament, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Sept. 
22, 2016), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2016/0922/Donald-Trump-Hillary-Clinton-and-
the-question-of-temperament [https://perma.cc/D7JP-YZ9N] (quoting Kearns Goodwin and other 
historians as listing humility, empathy, and patience; liking people; resilience; and not being disposed 
to “wallow[] in anger or resentment” as “basic qualities” for a president, ones “that are useful in a 
wide range of situations”). 
 26 Dickerson, supra note 25. 
 27 See infra notes 42–105 and accompanying text. 
 28 See generally ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (W.D. Ross trans., Batoche Books 1999) (c. 
384 B.C.E.). 
 29 Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 109th Cong. 36 (2006) [hereinafter Confirmation Hearings II], https://www.congress.gov/109/
chrg/shrg32199/CHRG-109shrg32199.pdf [https://perma.cc/45GL-G69G] (statement of Sen. Graham). 
 30 Id. 
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qualities are thought to promote. Though variance abounds, temperament gen-
erally is understood to manifest in patience, level-headedness in challenging 
moments, and being a good colleague; to be rooted in dispositions such as 
compassion and open-mindedness; and to be separable from other aspects of 
judicial competence—like intelligence—and from other influences on judicial 
behavior—like ideology.31 These core ideas are essentially correct, though in-
complete, inadequately specified, and undertheorized. 
The psychological literature on temperament and personality, particularly 
the foundational work of Jerome Kagan, is enormously helpful in remedying 
these defects.32 In psychology, temperament refers to trait-level individual dif-
                                                                                                                           
 31 See infra notes 106–273 and accompanying text; see also FED. JUDICIAL CTR., COMPETENCIES 
FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES 33 (2018) (defining judicial temperament narrowly as the “quality of 
acting with dignity and humility and treating others with courtesy and discretion, even in challenging 
situations,” and detailing its outcomes). 
 32 An important point of nomenclature here deserves mention. When this Article refers to psycho-
logical concepts of temperament, it means to embrace that discipline’s study of trait-level individual 
differences and their implications in adults. Although the psychological literature traditionally has 
distinguished between such phenomena in child development—historically labeled temperament—
and adult manifestations of those phenomena—historically labeled personality—this theoretical and 
linguistic divide is declining. See Mary K. Rothbart, Advances in Temperament: History, Concepts, 
and Measures, in HANDBOOK OF TEMPERAMENT 3, 9 (Marcel Zentner & Rebecca L. Shiner eds., 
2012) (“In recent years, concepts of temperament and personality in adulthood and childhood have 
increasingly come together . . . .”); Marcel Zentner & Rebecca L. Shiner, Fifty Years of Progress in 
Temperament Research: A Synthesis of Major Themes, Findings, and Challenges and a Look For-
ward, in HANDBOOK OF TEMPERAMENT, supra, at 673, 673 (“Placing research on the heritability and 
biology of adult temperament and the study of child temperament under one roof galvanized the field 
and helped to forge the identity of the field of temperament as it is known today.”). Further, adult 
temperament is now understood to refer to a smaller and more deeply-rooted set of intrapersonal at-
tributes than does personality. See Jaap J.A. Denissen et al., Personality Development Across the Life 
Span, in WILEY-BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 77, 77–84 (Tomas Chamor-
ro-Premuzic et al. eds., 2011) (exploring the overlap between research on personality and tempera-
ment). 
 Further, this Article does not seek to examine psychological, psychiatric, or physical disorders. 
Temperament, like many other factors, does have some bearing on clinical disorders; it may, for ex-
ample, moderate responses to adversity, or be associated with greater risk of particular psychopathol-
ogies. Liliana J. Lengua & Theodore D. Wachs, Temperament and Risk: Resilient and Vulnerable 
Responses to Adversity, in HANDBOOK OF TEMPERAMENT, supra, at 519, 519–21. The complicated 
interplay of temperament and clinical disorder falls outside the reach of this Article, and is nowhere 
near a straight-enough line to require the theory proposed herein to account for it. The important is-
sues associated with physical and mental illness in the judiciary is the focus of a relatively new move 
toward supporting judicial wellness, itself worthy of deeper study. See generally AM. BAR ASS’N, 
COMMISSION ON LAWYER ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, JUDGES HELPING JUDGES, THE JUDICIAL ASSIS-
TANCE INITIATIVE: RESOURCES & EDUCATION 44–61 (2010) [hereinafter JUDGES HELPING JUDGES] 
(providing information on good judicial mental health and resources to support it); U.S. COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, A WELLNESS GUIDE FOR JUDGES OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURTS 
(2015), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/lawyer_assistance/ls_colap_
2015_Wellness_Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/E4PS-F4UV] (addressing challenges to the mental health 
of judges and providing strategies to improve it). 
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ferences that underlie the ways in which different people react to, and cope 
with, similar situations.33 Part II sets forth two fundamental insights from that 
literature that undergird a new psycho-legal theory of judicial temperament.34  
First, temperament has a structural component. Temperament constrains 
how any given person may act, and is an important determinant of behavior, 
particularly behavior when under stress. Because of these structural attributes, 
a judge’s core temperamental traits are relatively hard to shake, and behavior 
in highly stressful situations is at least somewhat (and perhaps highly) diagnos-
tic of those traits. Temperament’s structure, however, is complex and interac-
tional. Its implications are co-determined by the unique mix of traits within a 
person, the attributes of the environment within which the person is asked to 
function, and the interaction between the two. Therefore, rather than conceptu-
alize judicial temperament as a unitary quality that one has or does not have, as 
we generally have done, we should recognize a range of judicial temperaments 
that will fit poorly or well with particular judicial assignments. 
Second, temperament has a substantive component, consisting of stable 
patterns of emotional experience and self-regulation. When we talk about judi-
cial temperament, then, we ought to be talking largely about emotion—both 
the emotional traits that sit at a person’s core and the behaviors those traits 
promote. The psycho-legal theory proposes that the substantive underpinnings 
of a desirable judicial temperament are, first, stable tendencies toward positive, 
prosocial emotions, dispositional kindness, and low levels of habitual negative 
emotionality, and, second, relatively high levels of skill with emotional regula-
tion.35 The theory does not call for perfection, and not every judge is expected 
to have an ideal temperament. Every judge should, however, clear the baseline 
conditions of being relatively low in negative emotionality, possessing at least 
some demonstrable trait kindness, and having at least moderate levels of emo-
tional regulation. 
This psycho-legal theory articulates the core of what we ought to talk 
about when we talk about judicial temperament. It has wide-reaching implica-
tions. It can shape mechanisms of judicial selection, training, support, and dis-
cipline, not just for the U.S. Supreme Court—a small target that draws enor-
mous attention—but for the tens of thousands of lower court judges in federal, 
state, municipal, and administrative courts across the country.36 It can inform 
                                                                                                                           
 33 Rothbart, supra note 32, at 3. 
 34 See infra notes 106–273 and accompanying text. 
 35 See infra notes 106–273 and accompanying text. 
 36 RON MALEGA & THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT ORGANIZATION, 
2011, at 1 (Nov. 2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/sco11.pdf [https://perma.cc/WAQ9-3S3Y] 
(finding there to be over 27,000 state court judges); Biographical Directory of Article III Federal 
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how we sort people into the specific judicial roles in which they are most like-
ly to thrive. It would also allow us to construct and support environments that 
maximize judges’ chances of thriving, and minimize their chances of failure, 
given their expected range of temperaments.37 
The psycho-legal theory also presents particular dangers. If the primary 
vice of extant accounts is indeterminacy, the primary vice of this one may be 
overdeterminacy. There is nothing in this new account that guarantees that 
shortcoming, but there is reason to worry that it may manifest. Part III concre-
tizes those dangers by showing the ways in which our human drive to catego-
rize ourselves has manifested in analytical schemes ranging from silly to evil 
to clumsy.38 After cautioning against such approaches, Part III invites robust, 
empirically-grounded exploration of the many ways in which the psycho-legal 
theory of judicial temperament could be used.39 Part III argues further that the 
psycho-legal theory explains why commitment to diversity and equality should 
not be regarded as factors of temperament, though influential accounts cast 
them as such.40 Such commitments should instead be recognized as independ-
ent requirements for judicial service in a diverse, democratic society.  
Finally, Part IV returns to the Kavanaugh nomination, presenting it as a 
lost opportunity for productive dialogue on the nature of judicial temperament. 
It further explores how the psycho-legal theory could have provided a sound, 
disciplined frame within which to have that dialogue.41 
This Article concludes by positing that the psycho-legal theory gets to the 
heart of the matter. It both explains what judicial temperament is and predicts 
how it may be assessed and, perhaps, improved. 
I. WHAT WE HAVE TALKED ABOUT WHEN WE HAVE  
TALKED ABOUT JUDICIAL TEMPERAMENT 
 Temperament, perhaps most critically, affects how judges decide cases.42 
The core judicial mission—to effectively decide cases—encompasses a 
wide range of behaviors. Most obviously, it includes the work of making legal 
                                                                                                                           
Judges, 1789–Present, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges [https://perma.cc/
QL5N-6XUK] (listing over 1,200 Article III federal judges). 
 37 Given the psycho-legal theory’s applicability to all these pivotal moments, this Article uses the 
term “judge” to signify both persons who already are serving in a judicial role and those who are seek-
ing judicial office. 
 38 See infra notes 274–311 and accompanying text. 
 39 See infra notes 278–285 and accompanying text. 
 40 See infra notes 286–311 and accompanying text. 
 41 See infra notes 312–325 and accompanying text. 
 42 Sutton, supra note 12, at 875. 
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and factual decisions—decisions about what the law is or what it requires in a 
given situation, how to exercise discretion, how broadly or narrowly to define 
legal questions, what versions of reality to credit, what level of deference to 
give other institutional actors, and so on. Although these aspects of judging 
draw the lion’s share of scholarly attention, other aspects of judicial behavior 
are also important, both because they have independent value and because they 
are closely intertwined with that decision making. How judges interact with 
the public, lawyers, litigants, jurors, witnesses, court staff, and one another, for 
instance, matters. Judges also act as colleagues, employees, employers, and 
supervisors. They may embrace the role of court manager, civic role model, or 
public intellectual. 
Judicial temperament speaks to this broader understanding of what judges 
do.43 Though it has implications for legal and factual decision making, it con-
cerns itself not with whether a judge is intellectually capable of parsing a stat-
ute, or the interpretive philosophy she will employ in doing so, but rather with 
how she will handle the job’s inherent challenges and how she will treat people 
along the way. As Supreme Court Chief Justice Roberts has written, excellence 
in judging entails “long hours, exacting skill, and intense devotion—while 
promising high stress, solitary confinement, and guaranteed criticism.”44 A 
person can have extraordinary intellect and training and yet be a miserable 
failure at handling these parameters of judicial life.45 That failure may manifest 
itself as an inability to carry out the decisional tasks of which she is capable—
for example, routinely denying meritorious objections because she is distracted 
from, irritated with, or disinterested in what attorneys have to say. Failure may 
also rear its head in callousness, arrogance, burnout, displays of disrespect—
both to the public and to judicial colleagues—and psychological and physical 
ailments.46 
                                                                                                                           
 43 See MARLA N. GREENSTEIN, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, HANDBOOK FOR JUDICIAL NOMINAT-
ING COMMISSIONERS 73 (2d ed., 2004), http://www.judicialselection.com/uploads/documents/Hand
book_for_Judicial_Nominating_Co_C46CEF0C61755.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5NR-SV67] (“The 
judge’s job includes contact with lawyers, members of the public and court employees and requires an 
inordinate amount of an elusive quality called judicial temperament.”). 
 44 CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2016 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 
8 (2016), http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2016year-endreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8DLT-Q7KN]. Although Chief Justice Roberts was speaking specifically of U.S. District Judges, the 
sentiment is equally true of appellate judging, though some sources of stress are different. See infra 
notes 158–163 and accompanying text.  
 45 Michael J. Gerhardt, Judicial Selection by the Numbers, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1197, 1205–06 
(2005) (stating that not all judges are able to “handle the intense pressures that come with the respon-
sibilities” of the position). 
 46 See JUDGES HELPING JUDGES, supra note 32, at 1–2, 44–57, 65, 70 (presenting range of prob-
lems that impaired judges can face, including mental health disorders and burnout, some of which 
may manifest in intemperate actions and misconduct). 
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Our enduring concern with judicial temperament reflects a shared notion 
that the non-intellectual aspects of a judge’s personal makeup matter. They 
may promote or hinder judges’ ability to carry out the basic functions of their 
jobs.47 They may promote or hinder the collegiality on which court functioning 
depends—something particularly important in the appellate courts, in which all 
decision making is a joint enterprise.48 They may promote or hinder judges’ 
longevity and well-being—independently worthy goals, but also important to 
preserving the investment society sinks into judges and the hard, disruptive 
work required to discipline or remove them.49 They may promote or hinder 
judges’ ability to grasp and care about the stories behind, and impacts of, their 
work. They may promote or hinder the public displays of respect and concern 
that, as the procedural justice literature shows, are critical to public confidence 
in the courts.50 
In short, temperament has real consequences for judges’ well-being, the 
quality of justice in individual cases, the soundness of the judiciary as an insti-
                                                                                                                           
 47 See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 31, at v (stating that temperament is “essential for success-
ful performance”). 
 48 See Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1639, 1639–40 (2003) (explaining the importance of collegiality in an appellate court). Frayed 
collegial bonds were starkly exposed in former Judge Richard Posner’s recent, highly contentious 
departure from the Seventh Circuit. In a hastily self-published book, Posner detailed his disputes with 
colleagues and—ignoring an ethics command that he not do so—included internal memos and emails, 
annotated by his comments. Patricia Manson, Posner Says Friction on 7th Circuit Bench Led to His 
Retirement, CHI. DAILY L. BULL. (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.chicagolawbulletin.com/archives/
2017/09/06/posner-bench-friction-9-6-17 [https://perma.cc/P66E-UYME]; Joe Patrice, The Seventh 
Circuit’s War with Judge Posner Really Escalated Quickly, ABOVE THE LAW (Oct. 31, 2017), 
https://abovethelaw.com/2017/10/the-seventh-circuits-war-with-judge-posner-really-escalated-
quickly/ [https://perma.cc/49AQ-JPAJ]; Matthew Stiegler, Posner’s New Book Is Bananas, but You 
Might Want It Anyway, CA3BLOG (Sept. 18, 2017), http://ca3blog.com/judges/posners-new-book-is-
bananas-but-you-might-want-it-anyway/ [https://perma.cc/9TB9-SXB7]. 
 49 See Terry A. Maroney & James J. Gross, The Ideal of the Dispassionate Judge: An Emotion 
Regulation Perspective, 6 EMOTION REV. 142, 142 (2014) (explaining how effective tools for emotion 
regulation can benefit judges’ ability to manage work); see also Douglas Keith, Impeachment and 
Removal of Judges: An Explainer, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.
brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/impeachment-and-removal-judges-explainer [https://
perma.cc/HTY4-M2FZ] (overviewing state and federal removal processes and stating that “[i]m-
peachment of judges is rare, and removal is rarer still”); Methods of Judicial Selection: Removal of 
Judges, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS., http://www.judicialselection.com/judicial_selection/
methods/removal_of_judges.cfm?state [https://perma.cc/92SD-XFT9] (detailing state-by-state re-
quirements for judicial removal). 
 50 See Kevin Burke & Steve Leben, Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient in Public Satisfac-
tion, 44 CT. REV. 4, 6 (2008) (finding that a public perception of procedural fairness—created by 
letting people’s voices be heard, showing neutrality, treating people respectfully, and inspiring trust—
generates positive emotions in the public and increases voluntary cooperation and compliance with 
legal authorities); Kristina Murphy & Tom Tyler, Procedural Justice and Compliance Behaviour: The 
Mediating Role of Emotions, 38 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 652, 652 (2008) (showing how procedural 
justice changes peoples’ emotions, which in turn affects their compliance behaviors). 
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tution, and the level of respect with which the public regards that institution. 
Hence the high stakes, and hence the intolerability of leaving the construct so 
ill-defined. 
This Part first elucidates what concepts are captured in the notion of tem-
perament.51 Section B then highlights concepts that fall outside of this catego-
ry, and therefore should not be regarded as temperamental.52 Section C ex-
plores how temperament is discussed in the psychological and legal fields, re-
spectively, and finds a common ground between the two.53  
A. What Judicial Temperament (Arguably) Is 
The construct of judicial temperament is ill-defined, but not entirely un-
defined. The few extant scholarly treatments offer some theoretical insights, 
though they tend not to explain how they ought to be operationalized.54 In con-
trast, judicial selection guidelines and processes, codes of conduct, perfor-
mance evaluation standards, and disciplinary norms—together delineating the 
spaces within which (and criteria by which) temperament is used to initiate, 
guide, measure, and terminate judges’ careers—largely lack a theoretical ba-
sis.55 Nevertheless, some value may be teased out of extant accounts. 
When scholars have talked about judicial temperament conceptually, they 
generally invoke four basic structural ideas. First, temperament is located in 
the person, not the office. Second, temperament drives the behavior of that 
person in that office. Put together, these ideas yield the central assumption that 
a judge with temperament x will, in environment y, act predictably with behav-
ior z but not behavior q. We look under the robe because how a person is con-
                                                                                                                           
 51 See infra notes 54–69 and accompanying text. 
 52 See infra notes 70–100 and accompanying text. 
 53 See infra notes 101–105 and accompanying text. 
 54 See, e.g., ROSEN, supra note 2, at 2; Ross, Functions, Roles, and Duties, supra note 12, at 64–
65; Ross, Questioning, supra note 5, at 129–32; Yackle, supra note 7, at 309–10; Sutton, supra note 
12, at 875. 
 55 See HOW IT WORKS, supra note 11, at 3 (providing general criteria for temperament without 
any support); Marla N. Greenstein et al., Improving the Judiciary Through Performance Evaluations, 
in THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 225, 233–36 (Gordon M. Griller & E. 
Keith Stott, Jr eds., 7th ed. 2001) (suggesting judicial temperament as a tool for assessment, but fail-
ing to explain what it is); Penny J. White, Judging Judges: Securing Judicial Independence by Use of 
Judicial Performance Evaluations, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1053, 1070 (2002) (providing only a sen-
tence to define judicial temperament). For a comprehensive overview of the element of temperament 
in performance evaluation, see Judicial Performance Evaluation, INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF 
THE AM. LEGAL SYS., https://iaals.du.edu/projects/judicial-performance-evaluation [https://perma.cc/
P6SB-AXWZ]. Sometimes the construct is invoked and left completely undefined, as in the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice. See James T. Hill, Achieving Transparency in the Military Panel Selection 
Process with the Preselection Method, 205 MIL. L. REV. 117, 137 (2010) (citing 10 U.S.C. § 825(d)(2) 
(2006), which requires the convening authority to consider judicial temperament but provides no fur-
ther explanation). 
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structed determines how he or she will function. Given this focus on predicting 
function, the third idea is that judicial temperament is valued not as a free-
standing virtue but instead because we believe it produces desirable behaviors 
in the daily work of judging. Fourth, temperament is thought to be conceptual-
ly separable from other desirable judicial qualities, such as adequate legal 
training, and from other influences on behavior, such as ideological commit-
ments. These foundational ideas are, as it turns out, nicely in line with the psy-
chological literature, as Part II.A demonstrates.56 The problem with the extant 
literature is that it inadequately articulates these foundational ideas about tem-
perament’s structure; further, it does not ground them in the relevant psycholo-
gy. 
At the substantive level, distilling extant treatments of judicial tempera-
ment reveals that certain characteristics repeatedly surface in the construct’s 
taxonomies. One such quality is compassion, an emotional response to per-
ceiving and caring about another’s distress.57 Another commonly cited trait is 
patience, judged by the ability to be even-tempered and exercise restraint in 
trying situations.58 Dignity also is mentioned with moderate frequency, as here: 
                                                                                                                           
 56 See infra notes 110–127 and accompanying text.  
 57 C. Daniel Batson, Compassion, in OXFORD COMPANION TO EMOTION AND THE AFFECTIVE 
SCIENCES 91, 91 (David Sanders & Klaus R. Scherer eds., 2009). A tendency to feel compassion is 
the first quality emphasized by the influential ABA Standing Committee. HOW IT WORKS, supra note 
11, at 3. The ABA Standing Committee evaluates the “integrity, professional competence and judicial 
temperament” of every nominee for an Article III judgeship in the United States, as well as Article IV 
appointments in the territories. See id.; see also ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, JUDICIAL RETENTION 
SURVEYS: JUDGES ELIGIBLE FOR RETENTION IN 2014, TECHNICAL REPORT 8 (2014), http://www.
ajc.state.ak.us/retention/retent14/techrpt14.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7G3-RRRC] (using temperament as 
a retention criterion, rated on a basis of “courtesy and freedom from arrogance” and a manifestation of 
“human understanding and compassion”); AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS ON STATE JUDICIAL SELEC-
TION: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION IN STATE JUDICIAL SELECTION STANDARDS 7 (2000) (prioritizing 
compassion similarly); Alfini & Gable, supra note 12, at 704. Snapshot views of Senate Judiciary 
Committee hearings on Article III appointments reflect a similar perspective. Nominees in a 1998 
hearing, asked to explain their concept of judicial temperament, made consistent and specific mention 
of compassion. Confirmation Hearings I, supra note 1, at 7, 267, 643. Even Chief Justice Roberts has 
emphasized that a district judge must “temper[] firm and decisive judgment” with “compassion.” 
ROBERTS, supra note 44, at 4.  
 58 GREENSTEIN, supra note 43, at 71. The ABA Guidelines for the Evaluation of Judicial Perfor-
mance (ABA Performance Guidelines) define temperament as “patience . . . dignity and understand-
ing,” a simple construction that gives that trait high prominence. AM. BAR ASS’N, SPECIAL COMM. ON 
EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, GUIDELINES FOR THE EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL PER-
FORMANCE 15 (1985) (outlining a model approach to assessment of sitting judges); UTAH STATE 
COURTS, supra note 11, at 19; Carl Tobias, The D.C. Circuit as a National Court, 48 U. MIAMI. L. 
REV. 159, 188 (1993) (referring to a proposed, but not adopted, definition of judicial temperament as 
“dignity, sensitivity and understanding”); see also FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 31, at 33 (a judge 
with good judicial temperament “[e]xhibits patience and exercises civility, courtesy, and tact in all 
interactions”); HOW IT WORKS, supra note 11, at 3; Gerhardt, supra note 45, at 1205 (“[A] district 
judge may largely work alone in deciding cases but still needs a great deal of patience to sit through 
long trials and other legal proceedings.”). 
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“[t]o be dignified a judge must possess ‘quiet, tactful ways, and calm yet firm 
assurance.’”59 Confusingly, dignity sometimes is treated not as a trait but, ra-
ther, as an institutional image or value that is promoted by judges with a proper 
set of traits.60 Indeed, it is common for discussions of temperament to elide 
lines between traits (for example, being a dignified person), the behaviors 
promoted by those traits (acting in a dignified manner), and the values served 
by those behaviors (promoting a positive image of the judiciary).61 Similarly, 
frequent invocations of demeanor capture not a trait so much as the multiple 
ways in which a judge—through facial expressions, tone of voice, and bodily 
movements—projects valued traits, including compassion, patience, and digni-
ty, but also calm, respect, and humility.62 Collegiality, another oft-named quali-
ty, similarly is described as both a “generous and respectful” attitude towards 
one’s judicial fellows and the concrete actions by which that attitude is mani-
fested.63 Finally, three other qualities that appear to be both highly valued and 
commonly regarded as temperamental are being open-minded, even-handed, 
and committed to equality.64 
Beyond this (relatively) common core, extant accounts propose an array 
of other traits and behaviors, such as humor, likeability, common sense, 
                                                                                                                           
 59 GREENSTEIN, supra note 43, at 73 (quoting J. Bernard L. Sheintag, The Benjamin N. Cardozo 
Lectures, The Personality of the Judge (1943), in THE PERSONALITY OF THE JUDGE 42 (1944)); FED. 
JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 31, at 33. 
 60 The ABA Performance Guidelines invoke both uses, defining judicial temperament as consist-
ing of personal dignity and cautioning that “a judge without good judicial temperament can do great 
harm to the dignity of the position.” AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 58, at 15. 
 61 See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 58, at 15 (calling for judges to act in a dignified manner); 
GREENSTEIN, supra note 43, at 73 (describing dignity as a trait); Burke & Leben, supra note 50, at 6–
7 (discussing dignity for its effect on judicial image). 
 62 See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 31, at 33 (describing the extent to which a judge 
“[e]xhibits an even tone, a calm voice, and appropriate body language under pressure”); JUDICIARY 
STATE OF HAW., JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE PROGRAM 2016 REPORT 4 (2016), http://www.courts.
state.hi.us/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/JP16REPT.pdf [https://perma.cc/9J5S-CDYX] (measuring 
“comportment” by reference to courtesy, compassion, patience, and absence of bias and arrogance); 
see also ARTHUR H. GARWIN ET AL., AM. BAR ASS’N, ANNOTATED MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CON-
DUCT 194–95 (3d ed. 2016) (construing Rule 2.8(B), a requirement that judges maintain a proper judi-
cial demeanor, as a temperamental construct); Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Regulating Dis-
courtesy on the Bench: A Study in the Evolution of Judicial Independence, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 497, 518 (2009) (discussing how judicial demeanor is seen as an indicator of judicial impar-
tiality).  
 63 See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 31, at 25, 33 (providing behaviors and expected outcomes 
associated with judicial collegiality); Gerhardt, supra note 45, at 1205–06 (emphasizing the im-
portance of collegiality); Sutton, supra note 12, at 875 (reflecting the view that temperament includes 
“being a generous and respectful colleague”). 
 64 See HOW IT WORKS, supra note 11, at 3 (asking nominees be considered on “open-mindedness 
. . . freedom from bias and commitment to equal justice”); Gerhardt, supra note 45, at 1205–06; 
Goldman, supra note 7, at 741 (describing how a judge should be fair and impartial when administer-
ing justice). 
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warmth, and willingness to work hard.65 The diversity of this array reminds us 
of how elusive the concept of judicial temperament remains. Further, it is at 
this juncture that scholars tend to fall into despair, and end up characterizing 
the construct as so “vague,”66 “unruly,”67 and “capable of so many defini-
tions”68 that “it is difficult to conceive of how so amorphous a criterion could 
be made more precise.”69 
B. What Judicial Temperament (Arguably) Is Not 
One strategy for countering such despair is to define the elusive construct 
via contrast with its supposed opposite. As the Utah application for judicial 
office states, “Judicial temperament is a quality which is not easily identifiable, 
but . . . [i]ts absence can usually be fairly ascertained.”70 
One rare (if abbreviated) scholarly treatment of temperament, offered by 
Lawrence Solum, explicitly reasons in this fashion. Grounding his claims in 
Aristotelean virtue ethics, Solum identifies the foundational judicial virtues—
that is, dispositions of mind or will that underlie just decisions—as temper-
ance, courage, good temper, intelligence, wisdom, and justice.71 It being easier 
to identify consensus on traits and behaviors we do not want in our judges, he 
draws out the nature of each judicial virtue by contrast with an opposing 
vice.72 Solum maps the contemporary concept of judicial temperament onto the 
virtue of “good temper,” or proates, which he juxtaposes with the vice of ex-
cessive anger. He is not uniformly anti-anger, unlike many Stoics.73 He urges 
instead that proates requires “proportionate anger,” which “alerts us to wrongs 
and motivates us to respond to them” but avoids misguided or outsized dis-
plays.74 Amusingly, Solum illustrates this virtue by way of Star Trek. He pro-
poses that Mr. Spock (were he a judge) would react “with equanimity to even 
the most severe courtroom provocations,” but is too logical and cold, while Dr. 
McCoy is “hot-tempered,” and “we imagine him flying off the handle” when 
provoked.75 Captain Kirk is just right, however, by being both “appropriately 
                                                                                                                           
 65 Ross, Questioning, supra note 5, at 130–33; Sutton, supra note 12, at 875. 
 66 Goldman, supra note 7, at 741. 
 67 Yackle, supra note 7, at 309. 
 68 Ross, Questioning, supra note 5, at 130. 
 69 Ross, Participation, supra note 15, at 65. 
 70 GREENSTEIN, supra note 43, at 93 (quoting the Utah Application for Judicial Office). 
 71 See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Natural Justice, 51 AM. J. JURIS. 65 (2006) (exploring the 
conceptual boundaries of justice in our legal system). 
 72 Laurence B. Solum, A Tournament of Virtue, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1365, 1368–76 (2005) 
(discussing judicial vices that are universally disliked). 
 73 Id. at 1372. 
 74 Id. at 1373. 
 75 Id. 
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outraged by bad behavior and injustice but nonetheless remaining ‘in control’ 
and responding in an appropriate manner.”76 Solum thus isolates the virtue of 
what I have called “righteous judicial anger.”77 He treats it as the sum total of 
good judicial temperament, conversely casting highly dysregulated displays of 
anger as the essence of poor temperament.78 
Indeed, the psycho-legal theory concurs that dysregulated displays of an-
ger are one reflection of a poor temperament, and the over-the-top variety con-
tribute significantly to the initiation of judicial disciplinary proceedings.79 
Even a cursory examination of such disciplinary cases, however, shows So-
lum’s formulation to be unduly narrow.80 Consider this example from New 
York, in which a judge was censured on temperamental grounds for being an-
gry, but also for being: 
arrogant, dictatorial, demeaning, loud, and degrading, and [for] hav-
ing attempted to frighten parties into settlement . . . . [T]he judge’s 
conduct amounted to a lack of judicial temperament which mani-
fested itself by shouting at parties, rudeness, abusive and bullying 
behavior, and some instances of extremely high-handed conduct and 
abuse of authority.81 
Other sources similarly reflect the view that broader indicators of poor temper-
ament are “arrogance, impatience, pomposity, irascibility, arbitrariness or tyr-
anny,”82 “rudeness, nastiness, and arrogance,”83 and use of contemptuous and 
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 77 Terry A. Maroney, Angry Judges, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1250 (2012). 
 78 See Solum, supra note 72, at 1372–74 (identifying excessive anger as the crux of poor judicial 
temperament, and asserting that all judges—trial and appellate—need to possess the appropriate anger 
that characterizes “good temper”). 
 79 See GARWIN ET AL., supra note 62, at 206–14 (collecting examples of judges sanctioned for 
“inappropriate expressions of anger,” including physical confrontations and yelling); Sharyn Roach 
Anleu et al., The Emotional Dimension of Judging: Issues, Evidence, and Insights, 52 CT. REV. 60, 70 
(2016) (analyzing examples of state disciplinary proceedings sparked by anger displays). 
 80 See generally Dodds v. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 906 P.2d 1260, 1270 (Cal. 1995) 
(explaining that the judge “repeatedly interrupt[ed] a litigant and yell[ed] angrily and without ade-
quate provocation”); In re Sloop, 946 So. 2d 1046, 1049 (Fla. 2006) (removing a judge for repeated 
displays of misconduct, including brandishing a firearm in the courtroom); In re Holien, 612 N.W.2d 
789 (Iowa 2000) (“The depth and breadth of [the judge’s] hostilities must have touched every aspect 
of her judicial services . . . . She has been like the proverbial bull in a china shop.”). 
 81 Disciplinary Action Against Judge on Ground of Abusive or Intemperate Language or Conduct 
Toward Attorneys, Court Personnel, or Parties to or Witnesses in Actions, and the Like, 89 A.L.R. 4th 
278 § 40 (1991). 
 82 GREENSTEIN, supra note 43, at 93 (quoting the Utah Application for Judicial Office). 
 83 Norman L. Greene, A Perspective on “Temper in the Court: A Forum on Judicial Civility,” 23 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 709, 712, 716–17 (1996) (pointing out that “blatant rudeness, nastiness, and 
arrogance . . . are well known to people who are frequently in the courts”). 
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insulting language.84 Anger alone does not explain such attitudes and behav-
iors.85 Although anger is an important element of both the virtue of tempera-
ment and the vice of its opposite, it is not the only element.86 
That being said, Solum’s account is welcome in that it correctly identifies 
differential propensities toward anger and its expression as an element of judi-
cial temperament. He also nicely distinguishes between episodic anger and 
underlying dispositions. Rather than criticize or praise the handling of any giv-
en conflict on the Starship Enterprise, Solum invites us to focus on the charac-
ters’ enduring qualities as a means to predict how they will handle conflict. As 
Part II.B. explains, this distinction is critical.87 Even the U.S. Supreme Court 
has opined that good judges can fly off the handle at times, and that although 
such instances are unfortunate, they do not necessarily reveal a general lack of 
fitness.88 Similarly, even though disciplinary actions sometimes are triggered 
by one extreme incident, they far more frequently involve a pattern of con-
duct.89 Judges who routinely explode, engage in outsized power displays, de-
mean others, and appear resistant to change seem so obviously “intemperate” 
that all can agree that, whatever judicial temperament is, they don’t have it.90 
Identifying the foil, these examples show, is one way—if an imperfect one—to 
move closer to a shared concept of judicial temperament. 
A second approach to clarifying temperament’s arguably elusive nature is 
to identify qualities orthogonal, not oppositional, to it. For example, Solum 
explicitly positions temperament as just one of a number of judicial virtues.91 
The conceptual work of separation requires boundary delineation. Indeed, no 
account imagines temperament as the only ingredient in judicial fitness. The 
ABA Standing Committee, for example, draws a sharp line between tempera-
ment and two other categories of fitness: integrity, which it defines as “charac-
ter,” “reputation,” “industry and diligence,” and professional competence, or 
“intellectual capacity, judgment, writing and analytic abilities, [legal] knowledge 
                                                                                                                           
 84 Confirmation Hearings I, supra note 1, at 667 (statement of Sen. Biden cautioning federal 
nominees not to be “arrogant,” “officious,” or “discourteous”); Roach Anleu et al., supra note 79, at 
66–69. 
 85 See infra notes 164–273 and accompanying text. 
 86 See infra notes 174–215 and accompanying text. 
 87 See infra notes 128–163 and accompanying text. 
 88 Maroney, supra note 77, at 1236 (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555–56 
(1994)) (describing such lapses as within the “bounds of what imperfect men and women . . . dis-
play”). 
 89 See GARWIN ET AL., supra note 62, at 74, 84–85 (noting that sanctions for failures of tempera-
ment, including rude or hostile behavior, generally follow a pattern of similar conduct). 
 90 Email from Alexander Boni-Saenz, supra note 14. 
 91 See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
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. . . and . . . professional experience.”92 A good judge, in the ABA account, 
needs all three. Under the psycho-legal theory, too, such desirable judicial 
qualities also are properly considered non-temperamental.93 
The ABA Standing Committee also disclaims any consideration of a 
“nominee’s philosophy, political affiliation or ideology.”94 That disclaimer re-
flects a belief—or at least the need to espouse a belief—that a judge with in-
tegrity, professional competence, and a proper temperament can be a good 
judge, no matter her politics, declarative beliefs, or approach to judging. This 
is not a perspective uniformly espoused.95 The plausibility of such a separa-
tion, though, may be seen by contrasting the late Justice Scalia with his succes-
sor, Justice Gorsuch. The two are similar with regard to judicial philosophy 
and ideology, but although many over the years have agreed with Scalia’s dis-
paraging view of his own temperament,96 Gorsuch drew widespread praise on 
that count during his confirmation proceedings.97 Indeed, one commentator 
dubbed him “Scalia without the scowl,” and quipped that “Trump’s nominee 
has the ideology without the temper.”98 To be sure, this praise of Gorsuch’s 
temperament suffered from the vice of vagueness, and more specific assess-
                                                                                                                           
 92 HOW IT WORKS, supra note 11, at 3. See generally FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 31 (divid-
ing competencies into knowledge, skills, and attributes, with temperament noted as one such attrib-
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 93 See infra notes 274–311 and accompanying text. 
 94 HOW IT WORKS, supra note 11, at 9. 
 95 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Ideology and the Selection of Federal Judges, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
619, 629 (2003) (“The former argument, that a person’s ideology is unlikely to affect performance in 
office, is impossible to sustain.”); Charles E. Schumer, Opinion, Judging by Ideology, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 26, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/26/opinion/judging-by-ideology.html [https://
perma.cc/6LNR-76HE] (calling for a pragmatic approach to judicial selection that considers ideolo-
gy); infra notes 278–285 and accompanying text. 
 96 See Maroney, supra note 77, at 1245–46 (describing accounts of the late Justice’s tempera-
ment). 
 97 The hearing transcripts from Justice Gorsuch’s confirmation to the Tenth Circuit show few 
references to temperament, and those that do appear are typically conclusory. See Confirmation Hear-
ings II, supra note 29, at 2 (statement of Sen. Allard) (stating that Gorsuch “possesses the tempera-
ment befitting an appellate judge”). 
 98 Andrew Cohen, Neil Gorsuch: Scalia Without the Scowl, MARSHALL PROJECT (Jan. 31, 2017), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/01/31/neil-gorsuch-scalia-without-the-scowl [https://perma.
cc/CUZ2-UY35]; see Neal K. Katyal, Opinion, Why Liberals Should Back Neil Gorsuch, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/opinion/why-liberals-should-back-neil-gorsuch.
html [https://perma.cc/4NTM-VB89] (attributing to Justice Gorsuch “a temperament that suits the 
nation’s highest court”); David Lawler, Neil Gorsuch: Who Is Donald Trump’s US Supreme Court 
Nominee?, THE TELEGRAPH (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/who-is-supreme-
court-nominee-neil-gorsuch/ [https://perma.cc/GH9J-8X8H] (“He is well respected by his colleagues 
in the judiciary and does not share Scalia’s fiery temperament.”); David G. Savage, Scalia’s Views 
Mixed with Kennedy’s Style: Meet Neil Gorsuch, Trump’s Pick for the Supreme Court, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 
31, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-gorsuch-supreme-court-20170131-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/837P-AXEP] (referencing his “superb” temperament). 
2020] Judicial Temperament 2105 
ments generally focused only on his calm and pleasant demeanor—just one 
relevant factor.99 The example nonetheless supports an important foundational 
idea, also supported by the psycho-legal theory: temperament is not everything 
we look for in a judge, and it operates independently from other qualities, both 
those we seek (like adequate legal training) and those we may commit to dis-
regard (such as politics). The psycho-legal theory of judicial temperament, 
however, parts ways with the ABA example in one particular way, namely, by 
identifying commitment to equality as a non-temperamental, ideological aspect 
of judicial fitness.100 
C. We (Sort of) Speak the Same Language When We  
Talk About Judicial Temperament 
As this distillation reveals, it is possible to excavate at least some com-
mon core in how we talk about judicial temperament. Consensus, however, 
should not be overstated. Even when taking a relatively focused view of high-
value traits and behaviors (like compassion and displays of patience) and low-
value traits and behaviors (like anger and aggression), extant accounts are un-
clear as to whether judicial temperament serves only to promote procedural 
justice values, collegiality, and the like, or whether, and to what degree, it also 
implicates substantive decision making.101 A highly elastic construct also 
leaves much room for conceptual slippage, subterfuge, and bromides, and 
thereby invites criticisms that are hard to counter except by resort to counter-
assertions equally devoid of content.102 Moreover, not all agree that the sort of 
                                                                                                                           
 99 See Cohen, supra note 98 (referring to Justice Gorsuch as “affable” and “measured”); Savage, 
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 100 See infra notes 274–311 and accompanying text. 
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temperament captured by the above distillation is necessary for one to be a 
good judge, or even a great one. During the debates over Kavanaugh’s nomina-
tion, one commenter wrote that many of the most highly regarded U.S. Su-
preme Court Justices “had disastrously bad, highly unjudicial temperaments,” 
as they were “nasty, vindictive, backbiting, ambitious and partisan” in addition 
to nurturing animosities and taking every conflict personally.103 The argued 
point is not that bad temperament is a good thing, but rather that a judge with a 
concededly bad temperament could still be great if he or she brings sufficient 
other value to the bench.104 
We thus still are left with a version of the question once asked of Justice 
Scalia: is there such a thing as an ideal judicial temperament, and if so, what is 
it, what does it do, and why do we care? As to each aspect of this question, we 
now have a stronger sense of where core instincts lie—an important analytic 
step forward. But these core instincts are not doing the work we expect of 
them. They have not gelled into a common understanding, based on sound the-
ory, capable of being operationalized. As the following Part demonstrates, 
folding these core instincts into a construct grounded in psychology both but-
tresses and complicates—and, ultimately, clarifies—what we should talk about 
when we talk about judicial temperament.105 
II. THE PSYCHO-LEGAL THEORY OF JUDICIAL TEMPERAMENT 
Psychological theory and research provide a disciplined lens through 
which to understand humans’ interpersonal differences—the major psycholog-
ical qualities that distinguish one person from another—and intrapersonal 
functioning—the ways in which those qualities combine within any given per-
son.106 These are the core concerns of judicial temperament: how to discern a 
given judge’s relevant traits, and how to separate those with desirable traits 
from those without them. Proceeding from the baseline truth that judges are 
                                                                                                                           
art’s nomination was successful and he still sits on the bench. The exchanges around his hearing, 
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 103 Noah Feldman, Opinion, Bad Temperament Alone Shouldn’t Sink Kavanaugh, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 
4, 2018), https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/commentary/ct-perspec-kavanaugh-temperament-
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 105 See infra notes 106–273 and accompanying text. 
 106 See Nicole B. Barenbaum & David G. Winter, History of Modern Personality Theory and 
Research, in HANDBOOK OF PERSONALITY 3, 7 (Oliver P. John et al. eds., 3d ed. 2008) (outlining the 
different approaches to personality research). 
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human, this Part synchronizes fundamental psychological findings about hu-
man temperament with fundamental features of judging. The resulting psycho-
legal theory of judicial temperament represents an attempt to elucidate the ex-
tent to which judges’ personal traits are likely to influence their work-related 
behaviors, and how; the specific traits that are most and least likely to promote 
desired behaviors, and why; and how we collectively can create environments 
that help judges achieve the best possible level of performance in light of their 
temperamental baselines. 
Section A of this Part encapsulates psychological research into tempera-
ment, which lays the groundwork for the psycho-legal theory.107 Section B sets 
forth that theory’s structural aspect—namely, the ways in which temperament 
constrains the possible self, significantly drives behavior, and interacts with the 
judge’s environment.108 Section C sets forth the theory’s substantive formulation, 
showing how particular trait-level patterns of emotional experience and self-
regulation would be predicted to serve or disserve desired judicial behaviors.109  
A. The Psychology of Temperament: Foundational Principles 
The psycho-legal theory rests on several foundational principles of devel-
opmental and personality psychology, principles synopsized here. 
Though each person is unique, interpersonal differences and intrapersonal 
functioning are not an endless series of one-offs. These aspects of our person-
hood sort into categories. For example, it is common in modern U.S. culture to 
refer to one person as an introvert and another as an extrovert, and to under-
stand that these rough categories—first—explain something about each per-
son’s consistent way of relating to the world, and—second—demarcate an im-
portant distinction that tends to manifest in particular behaviors in similar situ-
ations.110 This notion that humans can be sorted into such types has a long his-
tory in philosophy and medicine. The most familiar and enduring model of 
temperament, articulated by Hippocrates and expanded by Galen, divides all of 
humanity into four types—melancholic, choleric, sanguine, and phlegmatic—
according to purported admixtures of bodily fluids, or “humors.”111 The ele-
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 108 See infra notes 128–163 and accompanying text. 
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gant simplicity of that model has continued to enjoy enormous cultural pur-
chase, and has found particularly strong expression in the arts.112 
With the advent of psychology as an independent discipline over the last 
century, and with its enormous flourishing in the last decades, however, our 
understanding of temperamental traits has become far less rigid.113 We now 
think in terms of dimensions—that is, the idea that every person sits some-
where on a continuum for every known trait—rather than about fixed types of 
persons.114 Rather than describe any given person as “an introvert,” for exam-
ple, we would instead characterize that person as having greater or lesser de-
grees of introversion.115 The combination of many trait dimensions within a 
given person creates a relatively stable, distinct behavioral-affective profile—a 
kind of “temperament constellation.”116 Certain constellations occur with 
above-average frequency, and thus yield qualitatively meaningful categories of 
persons that are more numerous and nuanced than the four Galenic types but 
less varied than snowflakes.117 These trait constellations interact with situa-
tions to produce behavior.118 Some situations are relatively impervious to tem-
peramental influence—virtually all humans will try to escape a bear attack—
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 117 KAGAN, supra note 111, at 70–75. 
 118 Id. 
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although most situations—say, a cocktail party—allow for trait-driven behav-
ioral variation.119 
The core temperamental traits—which, as the following Sections will ex-
plain,120 have been identified as emotional reactivity and self-regulation—
emerge early in life, evidencing their heritability and biological basis.121 One’s 
environment, however, also plays a vital role. Temperament provides the 
“building blocks that underlie development of individual differences in per-
sonality,” but constant interactions and life experiences result in an eventual 
adult expression of that personality that is more complex and varied.122 Tem-
perament and personality thus are closely intertwined, the former forming a 
particularly deep stratum of the latter.123 Finally, adults display other distin-
guishing qualities generally understood to reside outside the orbit of tempera-
ment and personality. These include intelligence, learned skills, “acquired 
knowledge, opinions, beliefs,” and “tolerance toward others,” or what we 
might together call abilities and beliefs.124 
Thus, even in its more sophisticated modern iteration, science validates 
humans’ persistent drive to categorize. It is, in fact, true that we all “have fairly 
stable qualities (traits) that are displayed across many settings but are deeply 
embedded in the person.”125 Thus we go through our lives with “relatively en-
during individual differences in the tendency to behave, think, and feel in cer-
tain ways.”126 
Each aspect of a person—temperament, personality, abilities, and be-
liefs—is implicated in the kind of judge he or she will be. Not all, however, are 
equally implicated in the construct of judicial temperament.127 Those in-
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trapersonal aspects regarded by psychologists as temperamental are the key to 
understanding both the structure and the substance of the legal construct of 
judicial temperament. 
B. Structural Elements of Judicial Temperament 
With these fundamentals in mind, this Section dives deeper into what 
psychology teaches us about the structural elements of human temperament 
and weaves those insights into the context of judges and judging.128 In short, 
psychology strongly validates the implicit structural assumption that a judge 
with temperament x will, in environment y, tend to display certain behaviors 
but not others. Psychological research both provides the imperative to make 
that assumption explicit and reveals ways in which it should be refined. 
1. Temperament Constrains the Possible Self 
You all know you have a book on every judge in your district. You 
lawyers sit down and you talk about so-and-so being a horse’s tail, 
so-and-so being fair, so-and-so being a good person, a bad person, 
courteous, discourteous, arrogant, humble . . . . [M]y plea to you all 
is . . . [that] when the day is done and they talk about you, people 
say, you know, he or she was a courteous, decent, kind judge.129 
Senator Biden’s plea, made to a group of judges awaiting confirmation, as-
sumed that lawyers develop a highly particularized read on the judges before 
whom they appear. That “book” will capture a judge’s core personal qualities 
in a way that is both predictive of professional behaviors and unlikely to vary. 
The temperament literature evokes the same idea, but with a different 
metaphor: not a book but an envelope. An envelope, like a book, contains di-
verse content, but ultimately constrains. As Jerome Kagan and Nancy Snidman 
explain, “each temperament creates an envelope of possible outcomes, with 
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some more likely than others.”130 They were speaking specifically to the con-
straining properties of early-emerging traits measurable in infants and small 
children—for example, a tendency to react calmly to unexpected stimuli (a 
“low-reactive” profile). There is no straight line from such traits to their adult 
manifestations; initial temperamental profiles shape and are shaped by envi-
ronment over time. Thus, “different life histories create different personalities 
in children born with the same temperament.”131 The range of possibility, how-
ever, is bounded by the starting point. In Kagan’s words: 
[O]ne’s temperament imposes a restraint on the possible outcomes. 
A low-reactive infant might become a trial lawyer, investment bank-
er, navy pilot, or criminal, but it is unlikely that he will become a 
frightened recluse. Condensed water vapor can, depending on local 
conditions, form a white billowy cloud, a mackerel sky, or a dense 
ground fog, but it cannot become an asteroid.132 
Temperament thus “eliminates many more possibilities than it determines.”133 
Although people grow and change within their envelope of possibility, it is high-
ly unlikely that they will exit that envelope entirely. Further, some forms of emo-
tional and behavioral change—even if possible—will be far more difficult for 
persons with a given temperamental envelope than they would be for others, as 
they will require greater motivation, environmental support, and effort.134 
Temperament’s constraining properties are particularly relevant to adults. 
An adult’s temperamental profile will reflect some continuity from earlier 
stages in the life course. Not being able to predict at the front end which traits 
will endure does not mean that none will.135 Indeed, certain early-appearing 
tendencies, such as positive emotionality, empathy, anger, irritability, and skill 
with self-control, are particularly durable.136 Such durability signals a temper-
amental constraint that may be particularly tough to shake. Further, an adult’s 
envelope of possibility is smaller, and its contents more fixed, than it was in 
childhood. Personality continues to develop throughout the entire life course, 
even into old age, as do abilities and beliefs. Variability, however, tightens and 
                                                                                                                           
 130 KAGAN & SNIDMAN, supra note 121, at 3. 
 131 Id.; see KAGAN, supra note 111, at xx–xxi, 36. 
 132 KAGAN & SNIDMAN, supra note 121, at 3. 
 133 Id. at 23, 197 (“The power of each infant temperamental bias lay in its ability to prevent the 
development of a contrasting profile.”). 
 134 Id. at 29; see Zentner & Shiner, supra note 32, at 688 (noting that there “is a certain inertia to 
temperament,” and while people can develop in many ways “some ways are more likely than others”). 
 135 See Zentner & Shiner, supra note 32, at 675 (“Adult outcomes of early childhood tempera-
ment include adult personality traits, psychopathology, and school achievement.”). 
 136 Id. at 677, tbl.32.1; see KAGAN & SNIDMAN, supra note 121, at 26. 
2112 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:2085 
growth curves tend to flatten. By the middle stage of life, the age at which 
judges generally assume the bench, traits will be at their peak stability.137 
Psychology thus confirms a core instinct that judges present with robust, 
perceptible interpersonal differences, and that many of these differences are 
likely to be both deep and stubborn. It refines that instinct by explaining that 
we can anticipate some growth and change, particularly if that judge is highly 
motivated to comply with professional norms that push against his or her dis-
positions, is willing to exert effort to make such compliance habitual, works 
within an environment that makes compliance easier than its alternatives, and 
receives consistent support and feedback to ease that path. It is not, however, 
reasonable to expect the assumption of office itself to effect meaningful 
change, let alone to turn a judge into his or her temperamental opposite. By the 
time a judge takes office, what we see is, roughly speaking, what we get. 
2. Temperament Is a Significant Determinant of Behavior 
The point can be sharpened yet further. Not only is assuming judicial of-
fice highly unlikely to dislodge temperament-consistent patterns of behavior 
but it may very well entrench them. Temperament may be particularly predic-
tive of behavior under stress.138 Core traits predispose us to particular modes of 
perception and understanding of, and response to, our environment. When time 
is short, stakes are high, or a situation is ambiguous, humans tend to follow 
well-worn paths. Although patterned responses can be reflected upon and over-
ridden, doing so is a luxury, as it consumes mental resources and time.139 Tem-
perament thus acts as a “determinant of behavior under stress,” with its role 
being “especially evident in difficult situations.”140 
                                                                                                                           
 137 See Denissen, supra note 32, at 83–84 (showing that personality becomes more mature and 
stable as people age, and the least mean-level change is after age forty); Jennifer Lodi-Smith et al., 
Personality Trait Development Across the Life Span, in HANDBOOK OF LIFE-SPAN DEVELOPMENT 
513, 520–21 (Karen L. Fingerman et al. eds., 2011) (discussing a similar observation as Denissen). 
 138 See Jan Strelau, The Role of Temperament as a Moderator of Stress, in TEMPERAMENT IN 
CONTEXT 153, 161–62 (Theodore D. Wachs & Gedolph A. Kohnstamm eds., 2001) (explaining the 
connection between temperament, stress, and reactivity). 
 139 Shane Frederick, Heuristics, in OXFORD COMPANION TO EMOTION AND THE AFFECTIVE SCI-
ENCES, supra note 57, at 205, 205–06. The influence of heuristic processes (including the affect heu-
ristic) on judicial decision making has been most consistently shown by Rachlinski, Wistrich, and 
Guthrie. See, e.g., Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Heart Versus Head: Do Judges Follow the Law or Fol-
low Their Feelings?, 93 TEX. L. REV. 855, 863–67 (2015) (describing “affect heuristic” as a fast, 
intuitive process that judges can choose to examine and override through effortful and slow delibera-
tive processes). 
 140 JAN STRELAU, TEMPERAMENT AS A REGULATOR OF BEHAVIOR: AFTER FIFTY YEARS OF RE-
SEARCH 119 (2008); Strelau, supra note 138, at 154, 157 fig.8.1. 
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Any amplifying impact of stress is significant, because stress is a defining 
characteristic of judging environments.141 Indeed, in 2019, two major national 
surveys—one in Australia and one in the United States—showed the extent to 
which this is so.142 Australian researchers found “a judicial system not in men-
tal health crisis, but under considerable stress.”143 They further noted that 
symptoms of burnout and trauma are prominent features of the judicial stress 
experience.144 U.S. researchers found that judges’ occupational stressors—
ranging from the weight of decision making to unprepared lawyers—had a 
correlation with effects such as fatigue, sleep disturbance, attentional chal-
lenge, and rumination.145 Stressors are not confined to the trial bench, as some 
                                                                                                                           
 141 Jared Chamberlain & James T. Richardson, Judicial Stress: A Topic in Need of Research, in 
STRESS, TRAUMA, AND WELLBEING IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 269, 269–70 (Monica K. Miller & Brian 
H. Bornstein eds., 2013); Tracy D. Eells & C. Robert Showalter, Work-Related Stress in American 
Trial Judges, 22 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 71, 71 (1994); C. Robert Showalter & Daniel 
A. Martell, Personality, Stress and Health in American Judges, 69 JUDICATURE 82, 85 (1985); Ce-
leste F. Bremer, Impact of a Mentoring Program on Occupational Stress, Personal Strain, and Coping 
Resources of Newly Appointed U.S. Magistrate Judges 15–16 (Dec. 2002) (unpublished Ph.D. disser-
tation, Drake University), https://escholarshare.drake.edu/handle/2092/457 [https://perma.cc/W6H4-
MUFU].  
 I have completed the preliminary phase of a qualitative, interview-based study of Article III fed-
eral judges that includes exploration of stress and its impacts. TERRY A. MARONEY, WHAT JUDGES 
FEEL: HOW EMOTIONS PERMEATE THE WORK OF JUDGING (forthcoming). The judicial subjects all 
report multiple stresses of the sorts mentioned here, with perceived impacts on their well-being and 
job performance. 
 142 See Carly Schrever et al., The Psychological Impact of Judicial Work: Australia’s First Em-
pirical Research Measuring Judicial Stress and Wellbeing, 28 J. JUD. ADMIN. 141, 141 (2019) (exam-
ining stress and well-being in Australian judges); Coal. of Lawyer Assistance Programs (CoLAP), 
Presentation at the 2019 National Conference for Lawyer Assistance Programs, CoLAP’s 2019 Na-
tional Judicial Stress and Resilience Survey: The Results Are In! (Sept. 25, 2019) [hereinafter 
CoLAP] (on file with author) (PowerPoint presentation exploring the same in United States judges). 
 143 Scherer et al., supra note 142, at 167. 
 144 Id. 
 145 CoLAP, supra note 142, at 14–17. Stress seems to “go with the territory,” given judging’s 
“inescapably lonely features,” public pressure and scrutiny, lack of feedback, background (and some-
times foreground) threats of violence, and workload pressures. See Timothy J. Corrigan, Who Ap-
pointed Me God? Reflections of a Judge on Criminal Sentencing, JUDICATURE, Autumn 2016, at 25, 
26 (recounting assassination attempt); Michael Kirby, Judicial Stress—An Update, 71 AUSTL. L.J. 
774, 780 (1997) (describing how lonely the profession is); Monica K. Miller et al., Using Constructiv-
ist Self-Development Theory to Understand Judges’ Reactions to a Courthouse Shooting: An Explora-
tory Study, 17 PSYCHIATRY PSYCHOL. & L. 121, 123, 135–37 (2010) (presenting research indicating 
that stress from the threat of violence can affect judges’ personal well-being and professional perfor-
mance). Particular tasks, such as criminal sentencing, carry unique stressors. Del Quentin Wilber, 
Judge Who Had “No Passion for Punishment” Retires After 31 Years, WASH. POST (June 1, 2011), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/judge-calls-it-quits-after-31-years-sentencing-too-much-
to-bear/2012/06/01/gJQA1u3F8U_story.html [https://perma.cc/E9A3-KYG3]. Some judges face dirty, 
uncomfortable, even unsafe working conditions. Monica Silvia Ciocoiu et al., Implications of Levels 
of Stress Factors in Magistrate’s Activity, 15 ROM. BIOTECHNOLOGICAL LETTERS 126, 129–30 
(2010) (reporting data on Romanian judges’ stress stemming from factors such as poor lighting, inad-
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might suppose,146 particularly as appellate judges face the unique challenges of 
being dependent on one another.147 Of course, judging is (or ought to be) more 
than a traumatic daily grind. If it were not, we would ask why anyone would 
choose to do it at all.148 Indeed, the recent surveys indicate that many judges 
find their work less stressful than their prior legal practice had been, and signs 
of extreme distress appear less prevalent in judicial populations as compared to 
practicing lawyers.149 Judging’s many rewards include the pride of civic ser-
vice, the pleasure of intellectual challenge, prestige, and the ability to make a 
difference.150 Judging’s rewards, however, come within a package of challeng-
es. Temperament is a particularly important influence on a judge’s behavior 
when those predictable challenges cause predictable stresses. 
In addition to being amplified by stress, the behavioral purchase of tem-
perament will be strongest when environmental constraints are weakest.151 If a 
judge is predisposed to act in a particular way but would face certain and im-
mediate sanction for doing so—sanction here conceptualized as any outcome 
the judge wishes to avoid, from negative peer evaluation to removal from of-
                                                                                                                           
equate work areas, noise, and temperature); Bremer, supra note 141, at 15–16 (laying out common 
stressors in the judicial field). 
 146 ROBERTS, supra note 44, at 6 (explaining how U.S. District Court judges face “far more se-
vere time and resource constraints than their appellate brethren,” while being deprived of “the benefit 
of collegial decision making or the comfort of shared consensus”). 
 147 See Kirby, supra note 145, at 779 (noting the judge’s stress had not lessened after elevation to 
the Australian High Court because “the kinds of persons appointed to the court are prone to exert 
stress on themselves and on each other”); see also Gerhardt, supra note 45, at 1205–06 (stating that 
appellate judges must coexist “in relatively close quarters [and] successfully maintain respect and 
civility over long periods of time,” which is not easy). U.S. Supreme Court Justice Whittaker cited 
exhaustion and “continuous stresses” as his reasons for stepping down after only five years. Whittaker 
Is Leaving U.S Supreme Court, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 30, 1962, at 3. 
 148 See ROBERTS, supra cite 44, at 8 (“[J]udges make a difference every day, and leave a lasting 
legacy, by making our society more fair and just.”); cf. REASON AND IMAGINATION: THE SELECTED 
CORRESPONDENCE OF LEARNED HAND 51 (Constance Jordan ed., 2013) (reproducing a letter by 
Hand) (“I now see why people in former times went to such extravagances in telling judges what great 
men they were. If they had not baited the hook in some such way, the poor suckers would never have 
bitten.”). 
 149 Schrever et al., supra note 142, at 168; CoLAP, supra note 142, at 14–17. My own qualitative 
research with federal judges so far bears out these points. MARONEY, supra note 141. Many judges 
report that their stress is lessened by greater control over their schedules, relative to practice. Other 
judges, however, report that their work-related stress changed but did not lessen. Yet others report that 
they now have greater stress. Early analysis suggests these differentials depend on what sort of prac-
tice the judge had before taking the bench. 
 150 SHARYN ROACH ANLEU & KATHY MACK, PERFORMING JUDICIAL AUTHORITY IN THE LOWER 
COURTS 71–74 (2017); ROBERTS, supra note 44, at 8; Michael D. Kirby, Judicial Stress, 13 AUSTL. 
B. REV. 101, 115 (1995) (“[I]n the life of a judicial officer there is excitement, intellectual stimulation, 
personal satisfaction, still much public esteem, a general sense of social utility and worthwhileness 
. . . .”). 
 151 CARVER & SCHEIER, supra note 22, at 33 (explaining how one’s environment can affect their 
personality). 
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fice—she is more likely to exert effort to express a different behavior. Con-
versely, if a judge stands to be rewarded in a currency about which she cares 
(such as peer approval or promotion) for behavior toward which she is less 
habitually disposed, the odds of that behavior increase. The less certain, imme-
diate, and meaningful the sanctions and rewards, the more behavioral impact 
temperament will have.152 
Much of the judging universe is characterized by weak external con-
straints. Judges sometimes declare themselves “God in [their] courtroom,”153 
an assertion that, although literally untrue, does reflect the wide leeway we 
typically cede them. After all, norms of courtroom conduct require high levels 
of deference to the judge, even when her requirements seem odd or unreasona-
ble.154 Judicial discipline is rare; reversal is unusual (and sometimes impossi-
ble); rewards for norm-compliant behavior are few.155 Oversight is limited by 
the reality that the public seldom is in a position to observe what happens in 
most courtrooms, let alone what happens in chambers or conference. The 
enormous power of the judge means that whatever her trait constellation, it 
will have a relatively open space within which to operate. 
Given the ubiquity and multiplicity of judicial stressors, then, and the fre-
quently loose environmental constraints on judicial behavior, we are right to 
“worry most”—or at least to worry a lot—about temperament.156 We need to 
predict not how judges will act when putting their best foot forward, but how 
they will act under predictable pressures and with predictably minimal over-
sight. Some judges cope fairly well within these parameters, some thrive, and 
some struggle mightily.157 Temperament is an important determinant of into 
which camp any particular judge is likely to fall. 
                                                                                                                           
 152 Sanctions and rewards act as environmental constraints on expression of characteristics such 
as temperament, so in their absence a judge’s trait temperament will be uninhibited. See id. 
 153 Maroney, supra note 77, at 1268 (quoting Gottlieb v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 310 F. App’x 
424, 425 (2d Cir. 2009)). 
 154 By way of example, see Stephan Futeral, Practical Tips on How to Deal with a Difficult Judge, 
FUTERAL & NELSON, LLC (Oct. 26, 2014), https://www.charlestonlaw.net/deal-difficult-judge/ [https://
perma.cc/Q8U2-5UNU] (providing tools to practice before difficult judges); 6 Ways to Handle Difficult 
Judges., L. TRULY: L. BLOG (Feb. 12, 2020), https://lawtruly.com/6-ways-to-handle-difficult-judges/ 
[https://perma.cc/QNU5-JR62] (explaining how lawyers cope with difficult judges). 
 155 INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., RECOMMENDATIONS FOR JUDICIAL 
DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS 2–3 (2018). 
 156 Confirmation Hearings I, supra note 1, at 667 (statement of Sen. Biden); cf. Gerhardt, supra 
note 45, at 1205 (judicial nominees “need to be able to handle the intense pressures” of the job). 
 157 See infra notes 158–163 and accompanying text. 
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3. Temperamental Fitness Is Determined by Goodness of Fit 
The prior two Subsections explained that a judge’s core traits both (a) 
constrain his or her habitual range of attitudes and behaviors and (b) drive par-
ticular behavioral patterns within that range, particularly in conditions of stress 
and loose external control. A third structural point invites attention to person-
environment interactions. 
In popular parlance, temperament “is often referred to as a unidimension-
al quality that people have more or less of, not unlike intelligence or self-
esteem.”158 Similarly, we talk about judicial temperament as if it is something 
people simply have or do not have. This is a mistake. 
Judging is not a standardized profession—far from it. Judges might work 
in the federal, state, or municipal systems, be elected or appointed, enjoy life 
tenure or work under renewable contracts, earn relatively high or low salaries, 
hear trials or appeals, sit in urban or rural settings, enjoy shabby or well-
appointed surroundings, have a general or specific jurisdiction, wield greater 
or lesser docket control, and so on. As the parameters of any given situation 
are as important in determining how people will behave as are the traits they 
bring to that situation, we cannot focus only on the latter. Rather, we ought to 
think about goodness of fit between a judge’s temperamental profile and his or 
her specific work environment.159 The typical parameters of that environ-
ment—its cultural norms, repetitive tasks, recurrent stressors, mechanisms of 
oversight, decisional constraints, incentives, and daily rhythms—will interact 
with the judge’s temperamental constellation with varying levels of harmony 
or discord. 
Examining goodness of fit in the judicial context is clearly more compli-
cated than treating temperament as a unitary quality. It is the difference be-
tween an algorithm and an on/off switch. Accuracy, however, often requires 
complexity. Fortunately, as with all temperamental inquiries, looking to good-
ness of fit does not portend an infinite series of one-offs. As the following Sec-
tion demonstrates,160 relative strength or weakness in certain temperamental 
domains is closely associated with the attitudes and behaviors that should be 
                                                                                                                           
 158 Zentner & Shiner, supra note 32, at 676. 
 159 As explained by Thomas and Chess, seminal figures in the psychology of temperament: 
“Goodness of fit results when the properties of the environment and its expectations and demands are 
in accord with the organism’s own capacities, characteristics, and style of behaving.” ALEXANDER 
THOMAS & STELLA CHESS, TEMPERAMENT & DEVELOPMENT 11 (1977). When there is a good fit the 
individual is able to adapt and function effectively in his or her environment; under conditions of poor 
fit (“discrepancies and dissonances between environmental opportunities and demands and the capaci-
ties and characteristics of the organism”) maladaptive functioning is more likely. See id. at 11–12; 
Theodore D. Wachs & Gedolph A. Kohnstamm, Introduction, in TEMPERAMENT IN CONTEXT, supra 
note 138, at vii, viii (expanding on the importance of goodness of fit in temperament literature). 
 160 See infra notes 164–273 and accompanying text. 
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understood to typify a generally good or poor judicial temperament. Judicial 
assignments, too, can be sliced at a moderate level of abstraction—for exam-
ple, trial versus appellate, civil versus criminal, elected versus appointed—and 
still be of taxonomical utility. Some judges will be temperamentally suited to 
many sorts of judicial work, some suited only to particular sorts, and others ill-
suited to most or all sorts. Assessing those two factors interactionally deter-
mines goodness of fit. 
An analogy that has proved helpful in psychology is the distinction be-
tween dandelions and orchids. Some temperamental constellations are particu-
larly susceptible to environmental influences, others less so. A dandelion-like 
individual will thrive in just about any setting. Orchids’ survival, let alone 
thriving, depends on highly specific conditions.161 Dandelions are not neces-
sarily “better,” as their capacity for being spectacular is more limited.162 Above 
a baseline of temperamental suitability for any judicial role, some judges will 
be dandelions and others orchids. We would do well to identify where on the 
spectrum between a dandelion and an orchid a judge sits, so as to sort her into 
a setting in which she can thrive. This sorting is particularly important for the 
fussiest of orchids, judges who would be spectacular in only one setting. 
Goodness of fit firmly grounds one of the shared intuitions described in 
the context of President Trump’s candidacy: some trait constellations make 
individuals more or less suited to particular positions of authority. Professional 
success in one domain may not, and often does not, translate into success in a 
different one, not just because of the different abilities and beliefs upon which 
each may call but also because of the harmony or dissonance between one’s 
temperament and the parameters of that new domain.163 In the judicial context, 
this insight reminds us that being well-suited to legal practice may not translate 
into being well-suited for a judicial role, nor will a good fit in one judicial po-
sition necessarily bode well for fit in a different one. 
* * * * 
This Subpart has posited the following. Judges can mold or improve on 
aspects of their temperamental traits but cannot be expected to fundamentally 
                                                                                                                           
 161 See Zentner & Shiner, supra note 32, at 688–89 (encapsulating the “differential susceptibility 
thesis,” whereby certain temperaments are more or less influenced by environment). 
 162 See id. (describing how those with dandelion temperaments “will be protected from adverse 
environments but may in turn benefit less from enriching ones,” whereas those with orchid tempera-
ments may exhibit “particularly negative development in response to bad environments, but also ex-
ceptionally positive development in response to good environments”). 
 163 See Hagop S. Akiskal & Kareen K. Akiskal, In Search of Aristotle: Temperament, Human 
Nature, Melancholia, Creativity and Eminence, 100 J. AFFECTIVE DISORDERS 1, 4 (2007) (“[C]reat-
ivity and eminence and leadership in different professional domains are related to distinct optimal 
mixes of temperamental and cognitive profiles.”). 
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reorient or transcend them. Those traits will be an important determinant of the 
judge’s behavior, their relative importance varying from relatively weak where 
environmental constraints are high and stress low, to very strong when con-
straints are weak and stress high. Rather than think of someone having or not 
having a judicial temperament, we should ask which, if any, specific judicial 
environments are a good enough fit with his or her temperamental constella-
tion. The lesser the distance between a judge’s dispositions and a specific judi-
cial position’s demands for specific behaviors, the more likely he or she is to 
satisfy those demands with greater consistency and less effort. 
C. Substantive Elements of Temperament 
With these structural concepts firmly in place, we are ready to turn to sub-
stance. This Section identifies the traits that would be predicted to underlie the 
most widely-desired judicial behaviors—expressions of compassion, patience, 
humility, respect, and open-mindedness—in the greatest variety of judicial 
work settings.164 
The substantive component of human temperament may be conceptually 
reduced to two basic factors: habitual patterns of emotional attitudes and expe-
riences (often called “reactivity”), and habitual patterns of managing emotions 
and behavior, including capacity for impulse control (often called “self-regula-
tion”).165 Judicial temperament is, at its heart, about precisely those same things. 
It is important to note at the outset that emotional experiences are inherent-
ly neither problematic nor beneficial, including for judges.166 Emotion is an 
evolved capacity that enables us to navigate our world competently, a mecha-
nism through which we process environmental information, evaluate its personal 
                                                                                                                           
 164 See infra notes 164–273 and accompanying text. As goodness-of-fit analysis shows, there is 
no standard good or bad judicial temperament divorced from work context. For example, we may be 
able to tolerate higher levels of disadvantageous traits, and lower levels of advantageous ones, if the 
parameters of the specific judicial assignment buffer against the most damaging impacts of trait-
consistent behaviors. For example, a judge with relatively low self-regulation skill may be able to act 
well during infrequent, highly structured public appearances (such as oral argument) but be unable to 
do so on a trial docket. See infra pp. 2136–38 (explicating the most and least advantageous traits given 
the shared, baseline requirements of all judicial positions, and proposing how traits falling along a 
continuum between the two may interact with the demands and attributes of specific judicial posi-
tions). 
 165 See M. Rosario Rueda, Effortful Control, in HANDBOOK OF TEMPERAMENT, supra note 32, at 
145, 145–46 (discussing self-regulation and reactivity in children); Rothbart, supra note 32, at 9, 13 
(breaking down reactivity further into affect, activity, and attention, and self-regulation as the ability 
to control one’s reactivity); Zentner & Shiner, supra note 32, at 677–89, tbl.32.1 (describing traits 
associated with reactivity and self-regulation). 
 166 For an extended defense of this proposition and others in this paragraph, see generally 
Maroney, supra note 18, providing extended, empirically-based support for these positions. 
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significance, and mobilize action.167 Though law traditionally has cast emotion 
as the enemy of reason, that narrative is, simply put, untrue.168 Emotion is deeply 
intertwined with reason, as it both reflects our beliefs and values about the world 
and shapes how we feel, think, and act in that world.169 Like any evolved capaci-
ty that is adaptive most of the time, however, emotion is maladaptive some of 
the time. It can reflect false beliefs or bad values (for example, that persons of a 
particular race are uniquely dangerous), clash with social expectations (for in-
stance, feeling pleased about a death that others are mourning), or motivate a 
decisional style (such as quick judgment) or course of action (such as freezing) 
that is poorly suited to a particular situation.170 The relationship between emo-
tion and its suboptimal iterations is like that between cognition and its associated 
heuristics and biases.171 Both are processes that work well most of the time and 
poorly some of the time, the latter not diminishing the overall value of the for-
mer but, rather, requiring us to notice, question, and potentially override what 
feel like “natural” responses. These propositions are as true for judges as for all 
humans. When we talk about the substantive aspects of temperament, we there-
fore are talking not about the virtue or vice of any given emotional experience 
and how a judge regulates it, but rather about her deep, relatively durable pat-
terns of emotion and its regulation. 
1. Habitual Patterns of Emotional Experience 
We all are predisposed to process our surroundings with a particular emo-
tional style. Such habitual or trait emotionality consists of both the speed and 
intensity with which one reacts to stimuli—for example, something novel or 
frightening—and the content of those reactions—for instance, feelings of an-
ger, sadness, fear, or joy.172 Given the same stimulus, such as learning of a 
death, one person may be quick to react with outward expressions of anger, 
whereas another might process the information more slowly and privately, and 
tend toward sorrow. Reactivity patterns bear the hallmarks of temperament. 
                                                                                                                           
 167 See John Tooby & Leda Cosmides, The Evolutionary Psychology of the Emotions and Their 
Relationship to Internal Regulatory Variables, in HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS 114, 127–28 (Michael 
Lewis et al. eds., 3d ed. 2008) (describing the evolutionary function and advantage of emotions). See 
generally THE NATURE OF EMOTION: FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS (Andrew S. Fox et al. eds., 2d ed. 
2018) (exploring fundamental questions of emotion through the voices of leading researchers). 
 168 Maroney, supra note 18, at 642–51. 
 169 See id. (synthesizing psychological, philosophical, and neurological scholarship to offer exten-
sive support for these propositions). 
 170 Id. at 649–51. 
 171 Id. at 650 & n.111; cf. Wistrich, Rachlinski & Guthrie, supra note 139, at 863–65. 
 172 Richard J. Davidson, Approach/Withdrawal, in OXFORD COMPANION TO EMOTION AND THE 
AFFECTIVE SCIENCES, supra note 57, at 49, 49–50; Revelle & Scherer, supra note 123, at 305; Roth-
bart, supra note 32, at 9. 
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These patterns are at least somewhat heritable, are observable in both young 
children and adults, and are relatively stable (particularly in their adult mani-
festations).173 Such patterns cannot be globally assessed as good or bad. They 
are simply different, and become good or bad only in relation to what is appro-
priate for one’s environment and goals. 
Judging is the relevant environment for our inquiry, and producing the de-
sired set of behaviors the relevant goal. Certain patterns of habitual emotionali-
ty are particularly likely to promote those desired judicial behaviors, with oth-
ers particularly likely to do the opposite. 
a. Dispositional Negativity 
Dispositional negativity would be expected to have an undesirable effect 
on judicial behaviors.174 This temperamental profile admits of two rather dif-
ferent iterations: a stable tendency toward anger (and its close cousins, irrita-
tion, frustration, and contempt) or a stable tendency toward fear (and its close 
cousin, anxiety). In either iteration, dispositional negativity creates a propensi-
ty for overreaction to stressors, aversive challenges, and threats; manifests it-
self in negative feelings even when such stressors, aversive challenges, and 
threats are remote or absent; and predisposes a person to act in ways that evoke 
stressors, aversive challenges, and threats to which they then react.175 Disposi-
tional negativity also is likely to bias a person toward “indiscriminate” nega-
tive feelings and behaviors.176 Each of these impacts is negative in the judging 
context. 
i. Anger, Irritation, Frustration, and Contempt 
The anger-heavy iteration of dispositional negativity is particularly likely 
to promote the behaviors generally considered the markers of a poor judicial 
temperament. It is worth reiterating that anger itself is not the problem. As I 
have argued at length elsewhere, and as Solum would concur, judges not only 
                                                                                                                           
 173 See supra notes 110–163 and accompanying text. 
 174 See Alexander J. Shackman et al., The Psychological and Neurobiological Bases of Disposi-
tional Negativity, in THE NATURE OF EMOTION: FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS, supra note 167, at 67, 
67 (correlating dispositional negativity with reactivity to stressors). 
 175 Id. One general difference between these iterations is that the former set of emotions tends to 
motivate one to approach the offending person or situation, and the latter to motivate withdrawal. 
Nico H. Frijda, Action Tendencies, in OXFORD COMPANION TO EMOTION AND THE AFFECTIVE SCI-
ENCES, supra note 57, at 1, 1–2; see Davidson, supra note 172, at 49–50 (explaining the relationship 
between withdrawal and fear). But see Kevin S. LaBar, Fear and Anxiety, in HANDBOOK OF EMO-
TIONS 751, 751–52 (Lisa Feldman Barrett et al. eds., 4th ed. 2016) (noting that specific fear episodes 
can also call up a “fight” response rather than a “flight” one). 
 176 Shackman et al., supra note 174, at 71. 
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regularly get angry, but sometimes they should.177 As one eminent philosopher 
put it, “Can one have a sense of justice without the capacity and willingness to 
be personally outraged?”178 Even misplaced or slightly excessive displays of 
anger are normal, given the welter of offensive behavior to which judges regu-
larly are exposed, and often can be tolerated when they are infrequent and their 
concrete impacts contained.179 If our concern is with judicial temperament, our 
focus properly is on frequent, reflexive, inadequately justified, vehemently ex-
pressed anger, as such a pattern is likely be to rooted in an underlying trait.180 
Dispositional anger consists of a stable tendency “to attribute hostile in-
tent in others’ actions, to perceive frustration in a variety of situations, and to 
engage in continuous conscious pondering and rumination over one’s own an-
ger, as well as the perceived provocations of others.”181 Persons high in trait 
anger demonstrate heightened frequency and intensity of mood changes, and 
increased reactivity to stress.182 This disposition also tends to manifest in con-
flictual behaviors. Temperamentally “hostile and argumentative” persons “tend 
to be vigilant for potential provocation from others, to initiate and sustain ar-
guments when provocation is perceived, and to react angrily when others’ be-
haviors are viewed as hostile or rejecting.”183 Dispositional anger also tends to 
entail frequent experiences of the closely-related emotions of frustration and 
irritation.184 Frustration is an uncomfortable feeling attending the perception 
that one’s goals are being blocked or desires thwarted.185 Irritation, too, is un-
                                                                                                                           
 177 Righteous judicial anger is, in Aristotelean terms, virtuous—felt “at the right times, with refer-
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ARISTOTLE, supra note 28, bk. II, at 27; Maroney, supra note 77, at 1206 (explaining how a righteous-
ly angry judge accurately assesses that someone has committed an unwarranted act, is motivated to 
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 181 Deater-Deckard & Wang, supra note 180, at 126. 
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HANDBOOK OF TEMPERAMENT, supra note 32, at 368, 369–70; see Rothbart, supra note 32, at 7–8. 
 183 Deater-Deckard & Wang, supra note 180, at 126. 
 184 Id. at 124–25 tbl.7.1. 
 185 Id. 
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comfortable, though less intense than anger and without as strong an element 
of moral judgment.186 Both emotional states can be entirely warranted, but 
when habitual—what we colloquially might call irascibility or grouchiness—
they are just as worrisome as anger, particularly because they are similarly 
linked to verbal and physical aggression.187 Further, a habitually angry person 
may regularly feel and display another closely-related emotion: contempt.188 
Contempt combines aspects of anger and disgust. Like anger, it reflects a percep-
tion of wrongdoing, and like disgust, it reflects a judgment that the offender is 
repulsive.189 Contempt is especially dangerous for judges. Contempt marks the 
difference between legitimate expressions of authority and illegitimate expres-
sions of superiority. Contemptuous treatment is a familiar element of judicial 
disciplinary proceedings, generally involving insults, ridicule, and ritual humilia-
tion.190 
The anger-frustration-irritation triptych, even without a contempt element, 
thus embodies an underlying disposition not only for a specific sort of internal 
experience—such as “thinking angry thoughts” and having “angry feelings”—
but also for aggressive speech and behaviors reflecting those thoughts and feel-
ings.191 In fact, by expressing less warmth, escalating, and engaging in “toxic 
interpersonal behaviors” like use of “contempt and sarcasm,” persons with this 
temperamental profile actually may create conflictual situations, to which they 
will then have characteristically exaggerated responses.192  
Particularly with a contempt element, this trait cluster poses a real danger 
of regular manifestation of the hostile, dismissive, sarcastic, callous, and rude 
behaviors that are a relative-consensus hallmark of poor judicial tempera-
ment.193 This trait cluster also can lead to decisional errors. Left unchecked, 
anger and its close cousins can curtail deliberation and increase punitive be-
havior, regardless of whether those feelings are relevant or justified—a particu-
lar danger for judges who tend to feel these emotions with greater frequency 
                                                                                                                           
 186 Id.; Peter Kuppens, Irritation, in OXFORD COMPANION TO EMOTION AND THE AFFECTIVE 
SCIENCES, supra note 57, at 226, 226–27. 
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and less justification.194 Moreover, this pattern of emotional experience con-
tributes to poor health outcomes, including cardiovascular pathophysiology 
and substance abuse, both of which can affect judges’ professional perfor-
mance and longevity.195 
Further, the general rule that “what we see in an adult judge is what we 
are likely to get” has particular purchase for this iteration of dispositional 
negativity. Although many judges share the same environmental challenges 
and stressors, only some display this behavioral profile. Though the parameters 
of dispositional anger may vary over time, the “magnitude of change over 
adulthood is modest,” if it happens at all.196 Change is likely to be even more 
constricted the more extreme the trait profile and the weaker any meaningful 
environmental pushback. A judge that presents with strong indicators of this 
sort of dispositional negativity therefore is a very risky bet. Such a judge is 
likely to continue to manifest a short fuse, antisocial attitudes, and aggressive 
behaviors, absent an intervention that effectively addresses the trait, the envi-
ronmental constraints that allow the trait to be expressed, or both.197 
ii. Fear and Anxiety  
The second iteration of dispositional negativity, a tendency toward fear and 
anxiety, also poses a challenge to judicial temperament, if a less visible one.198 
A fearful disposition implicates judicial temperament by hindering devel-
opment of courage. Courage is an underappreciated aspect of judicial fitness. 
Although tributes to great judges often laud their courage,199 it is not generally 
                                                                                                                           
 194 Maroney, supra note 77, at 1265–69 (citing to, inter alia, Jennifer S. Lerner & Larissa Z. 
Tiedens, Portrait of the Angry Decision Maker: How Appraisal Tendencies Shape Anger’s Influence 
on Cognition, 19 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 115 (2006); and Paul M. Litvak et al., Fuel in the 
Fire: How Anger Impacts Judgment and Decision-Making, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF AN-
GER: CONSTITUENT AND CONCOMITANT BIOLOGICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND SOCIAL PROCESSES 
(Michael Potegal et al. eds., 2010)). 
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included in law’s temperamental taxonomies (nor, for that matter, is it folded 
into the independent constructs of integrity and competence).200 Judicial inde-
pendence, however, requires courage, and courage is temperamental. The hard 
reality of actual and threatened violence against judges and their families, for 
example, could push judges to rule so as to avoid making enemies.201 Never-
theless, we require that they resist that push. Similarly, the threat of angering 
or alienating professional and social peers, powerful constituencies, and fellow 
government actors in the other branches could pull judges away from difficult 
but necessary actions. We likewise require that they resist that pull.202  
The building blocks of courage—differential propensities toward submis-
siveness, timidity, and fear—are basic iterations of habitual emotionality, ob-
servable in both children and in adults. They have a genetic basis, show rela-
tive stability (particularly in adults), and express in behavior.203 To be clear, 
episodic fear is critical to normal human functioning, including in a judge.204 
Indeed, courage is not the absence of fear but the ability to act consistent with 
one’s goals and values despite reasonable fears.205 Chronic fearfulness, howev-
er, can overwhelm that capacity, instead motivating avoidance and withdraw-
al.206 As Chief Justice Roberts has observed, judging is no job for “timid . . . 
souls.”207 High levels of trait fearfulness threaten something desired, just as 
surely as high levels of trait anger promise something undesired. 
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 207 ROBERTS, supra note 44, at 6. 
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Closely related to trait fearfulness is trait anxiety.208 Though these phe-
nomena may (and often do) co-occur, they are not the same thing. Fear is 
linked to an identifiable trigger, whereas anxiety is more global, characterized 
by an unpleasant feeling that one’s environment is uncertain and potentially 
threatening.209 Like fear, anxiety has functional utility. Humans need to be able 
to imagine future threats and negative consequences so that we can avert or 
plan for them.210 Indeed, a deficit of anxiety would be highly troublesome in a 
judge, perhaps signifying undue confidence in the “right” answer, underestima-
tion of the dangers of mistake, and a lack of concern with stakes. Research has 
even shown that anxiety can promote high levels of work performance, if we 
appraise anxiety-producing events as challenges as opposed to hazards.211 Per-
sons with elevated trait anxiety, however, are likely, if exposed to stressors, to 
experience more frequent (and likely more intense) episodes of anxiety with 
less justification, and will be biased toward interpreting even ambiguous 
events as threatening.212 In addition to dampening the potential for moments of 
courage, as fearfulness would, persistently elevated anxiety (in addition to be-
ing subjectively distressing) would theoretically make a judge less decisive.213 
Trait fearfulness and anxiety therefore should be acknowledged as core 
concerns of judicial temperament. A judge who sits at their upper extremes 
would have a difficult time withstanding the demands of the position.214 The 
habitually fearful or anxious judge whose traits present in a pronounced but less 
extreme manner may well be able to withstand such pressures, but will need to 
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both find a judicial role that is least endangered by these traits and invest in 
building the regulatory skills that will enable her to mitigate their impacts.215 
b. Positive Emotionality 
Desired judicial behaviors are more likely not only when the above-
described traits are absent or relatively low, but also when other traits are rela-
tively high. One such trait dimension is “positive emotionality,” another broad 
construct that embraces two distinct patterns.216 The first is a propensity for 
calm satisfaction, including with lower-intensity stimuli, and frequent feelings 
and expressions of pleasantness. The second tends toward exuberance, excite-
ment, joy, and sensation-seeking.217 Both forms of positive emotionality bring 
significant benefits. They buffer against depression, promote resilience and 
longevity, and generate both enhanced social competence and “sustained en-
gagement and expectations of success.”218 Dispositionally positive persons 
also tend to be more open-minded. They have a broadened perspective on their 
own thoughts and actions, as well as the thoughts and actions of others, in con-
trast to the “narrowed mindsets sparked by negative emotions.”219 The disposi-
tionally positive judge will not, of course, feel happy or content at all times, 
nor should she, as that would be a highly abnormal reaction to often distressing 
circumstances. She is, however, more likely than those with opposing disposi-
tions to be resilient, engage productively with others, and maintain an open 
mind with less effort. 
Though both forms of positive emotionality generally are a boon, they are 
not necessarily equally good fits with the opportunities and challenges that 
typify many forms of judging. The low-arousal iteration of dispositional posi-
tivity will most consistently promote expressions of calm and patience—
listening without interrupting, giving matters the time they need, and speaking 
in a measured tone. That disposition generally is inconsistent with feelings of 
impatience and frustration.220 Although judges can (and do) learn to adopt a 
calm demeanor despite a contrary internal state, including an aroused one,221 
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one who generally defaults to feeling calm will find it far easier to consistently 
display calm behaviors.222 
Relative to their calmer counterparts, judges with the high-arousal, exu-
berant iteration of positivity are less likely to consistently display these desired 
low-arousal behaviors. Such persons desire rewards and pursue goals with par-
ticular fervor, and react with heightened elation when successful but with 
heightened frustration when unsuccessful.223 For better or worse, judges sel-
dom enjoy high-adrenalin rewards. Their victories tend to be of the muted, per-
spectival sort—for example, knowing that one has done a good job in difficult 
circumstances, articulating a difficult concept in a way that will further the 
progress of law, enjoying the camaraderie of clerks and colleagues, or appreci-
ating one’s contribution to the democratic project.224 Simultaneously, high-
adrenalin goal blockages abound—for example, attorneys whose marginally-
competent verbosity is holding up a proceeding, or appellate colleagues who 
refuse to endorse or even debate a passionately held position. Given the lop-
sided reward/blockage ratio judges tend to face, a high-exuberant temperament 
profile would be predicted more frequently to manifest in impatience and even 
aggression.225 Thus, trait exuberance can cause some of the negative behaviors 
primarily linked to dispositional anger, as both are associated with high arous-
al. Further, the high-exuberant judge may be more at risk of boredom during 
routine and tedious moments, which most forms of judging serve up regular-
ly.226 She may, however, find difficult tasks appealing, as they are highly stim-
ulating; be particularly sustained by bigger victories; and seek leadership posi-
tions, thereby propelling institutional innovation. 
In general, the dispositionally positive judge of either sort is likely to be a 
good temperamental bet. Within that category, the judge characterized by a 
propensity toward calm satisfaction is least likely to exhibit aggressive, impa-
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tient behaviors, because she is least likely to feel the emotions that spur such 
behaviors, and she is most likely to find pleasure in the small, quiet, often pri-
vate victories of judging. The exuberant judge, though facing relatively greater 
challenge on those fronts, is still likely to fare better than her dispositionally 
negative counterpart. More, she will bring significant energy to the bench. 
c. Kindness 
Also highly relevant to judicial temperament is a relatively new member 
of psychologists’ temperamental taxonomies: dispositional kindness. This con-
cept speaks not to individual acts of kindness, which may or may not be ap-
propriate in any given situation, but rather to a deep-seated “constellation of 
positive attitudes, feelings, and behaviors toward others,” including “empathy, 
prosocial behavior, generosity, and altruism.”227 Whereas dispositional positiv-
ity is directed to the self, dispositional kindness is directed toward others. Peo-
ple differ significantly in these emotional capacities, experiences, and the be-
haviors they motivate.228 Further, those differences are observable in both chil-
dren and adults, are amenable to measurement, appear to have distinct neural 
and genetic correlates, and show substantial longitudinal stability across the 
life course.229 
Dispositional kindness is, like trait fearfulness, an underappreciated deter-
minant of judicial fitness that should be recognized as temperamental. Empathy, 
or the propensity to understand and care about others’ emotional states, is at the 
center of trait kindness; prosocial behaviors, or voluntary acts intended to benefit 
others, are its prototypical behavioral manifestation; and feelings of compassion 
link the two.230 As we have seen, compassion is one of the most consistently cit-
ed elements of judicial temperament in extant accounts, though such accounts 
seldom explain why.231 It is, further, a bit of an oddity, the only high-consensus 
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element that is transparently emotional. In a cultural environment that generally 
eschews judicial emotion and that periodically erupts with “radioactive” clashes 
over judicial empathy,232 compassion appears as a rare designated emotional 
outpost.233 The psycho-legal theory solves this apparent puzzle. We evaluate 
traits by reference to the functions they are thought to serve in the daily work of 
judging, and compassion promotes desired behaviors. Moderate to high trait 
kindness inclines people to have and to demonstrate respect for their fellow hu-
mans: to be willing to listen to them, to understand them, to care about them, and 
to be willing to work hard to serve them well.234 Low dispositional kindness, at 
the opposite pole, expresses in trait callousness and misanthropy. That trait 
would be expected to manifest in the displays of arrogance, rudeness, and disre-
gard that fray social bonds among judges and between the judiciary and the pub-
lic. We have lacked the vocabulary with which to explain why compassion feels 
both important and temperamental. Fortunately, this theory provides it.  
Judging is a particularly demanding and important form of public service, 
so it makes sense that we would value persons who naturally are inclined to 
care about that public. Gainsaying that proposition appears as difficult as over-
coming the law’s general aversion to judicial emotion. Indeed, tributes to 
“great judges” typically praise them not just for their intellect and courage but 
also for their benevolence.235 One much-beloved judge has written that “[i]f 
we judges could possess but one attribute, it should be a kind and understand-
ing heart. The bench is no place for cruel or callous people regardless of their 
other qualities and abilities.”236 In the words of another, “[A] judge is more 
likely to reach a just answer if he or she cares.”237 
Moderate to high levels of trait kindness therefore should be understood 
as critical determinants of a good judicial temperament. In addition to promot-
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ing displays of respect and caring, these levels would be expected to buffer 
against judicial cynicism and despair, attitudes that feed destructive behaviors 
toward both the public and the self. The work of judging often shows humanity 
at its worst. To perform that work well over time requires a fundamental dispo-
sition to believe in humanity’s essential decency.238 
Extremely high levels of trait kindness, however, present specific dangers. 
A judge who is too closely attuned to the emotions and needs of others may, 
given the spectrum of human suffering with which most judges regularly are in 
contact, experience emotional exhaustion, compassion fatigue, and burnout, all 
of which can damage well-being and job performance.239 Such a judge may 
also be at risk of “pathological altruism.”240  
At non-pathological levels, though, the high-kindness individual will take 
more available opportunities to act prosocially, and will incur greater costs to 
do so, than will persons with lesser levels of this trait. They remain, however, 
sensitive to opportunity and cost, and will not extend helping behaviors if do-
ing so would violate their own sense of priorities and ethics.241 We therefore 
would expect the dispositionally kind judge, if ethical and competent, to obey 
the rule of law, acting as prosocially as the law permits but no more.242 A judge 
at the highest extremes of this trait, in contrast, would be expected to find stay-
ing in his lane unusually challenging if doing so were to require him to with-
hold helping behaviors. Short of that extreme, however, trait kindness is a core 
aspect of a good judicial temperament. 
* * * * 
This subsection has proposed the following. At the substantive level, to 
possess a generally good judicial temperament means to have a relatively low 
propensity to experience emotional states likely to express in undesirable be-
haviors, and a relatively high propensity to experience emotional states likely 
to express in desirable ones. Judges high in trait anger are particularly likely to 
experience anger, irritation, frustration, and contempt, to perceive situations as 
                                                                                                                           
 238 A widely beloved judge with whom this author works frequently, and who is possessed of a 
great love of humanity, recounts how even he once came home from a difficult day on the bench and 
said to his wife, “You know, people suck.” 
 239 Monica K. Miller et al., Judicial Stress: The Roles of Gender and Social Support, 25 PSYCHI-
ATRY PSYCHOL. & L. 602, 602–04, fig.1 (2018). 
 240 Knafo & Israel, supra note 227, at 169 (explaining how polar opposites on this trait dimension 
are the extremely low levels of empathy found in psychopathy and autism, and uncontrolled, emotion-
ally exhausting empathy). 
 241 Id. at 175 (describing how one might feel empathy with and compassion for earthquake vic-
tims, but be unwilling or unable to overcome barriers to helping, such as lack of money or time to 
volunteer). 
 242 Cf. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 31, at 29 (stating that a competent judge “[e]xpresses 
empathy for others in appropriate ways”). 
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personally arousing and offensive, and to display aggressive and disrespectful 
behaviors. A less dramatic but still meaningful temperamental vulnerability is 
posed by those high in trait fearfulness, as they are less likely to maintain the 
courage necessary to make difficult decisions. Judges prone to very high levels 
of anxiety may be indecisive and lack sufficient resilience to handle the posi-
tion’s demands. In contrast, judges high in trait positivity are likely to exhibit 
resilience, competence in interpersonal relationships, and open-mindedness. 
Judges whose trait positivity tends toward satisfaction and contentment are 
particularly likely to both feel and project calm, and to derive pleasure from 
ordinary accomplishments. Judges whose positivity tends toward exuberance 
and joy may have to work harder to project calm and to cope with boredom, 
but are likely to take on difficult tasks with enthusiasm and to relish achieve-
ments. Finally, temperamentally kind judges would be expected to resist cyni-
cism, to regularly treat others with understanding and compassion, and, when 
the law allows, to extend permissible forms of relief to those in distress, 
whether at the individual or systemic level. 
2. Habitual Patterns of Self-Regulation 
The speed, intensity, and content of emotional responses is one pillar of 
psychological temperament. Self-regulation, the second pillar, is just as deep-
seated and influential. It is equally as critical to judicial temperament. 
Rather than being at the mercy of our emotions, humans regularly exert 
effort to influence what emotions we have, when we have them, and how those 
emotions are experienced and expressed—for example, so as to conform to 
social expectations and professional norms.243 We do so with a wide variety of 
strategies, such as adopting a “poker face,” biting our tongue, thinking about 
something else, or avoiding certain people and situations.244 Also referred to as 
“effortful control,” this dimension is driven by an individual’s intrinsically mo-
tivated ability to control their emotions.245 In adults, this dimension captures 
                                                                                                                           
 243 See James J. Gross, Antecedent- and Response-Focused Emotion Regulation: Divergent Con-
sequences for Experience, Expression, and Physiology, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 224, 
226 (1998) (exploring regulatory strategies designed to change the emotion-eliciting situation, or 
interpretation of and/or response to that situation); see also Iris B. Mauss et al., Culture and Automatic 
Emotion Regulation, in REGULATING EMOTIONS: CULTURE, SOCIAL NECESSITY, AND BIOLOGICAL 
INHERITANCE 39, 40 (Marie Vandeckerckhove et al. eds., 2008) (“[D]eliberate or automatic changes 
in any aspect of the emotional response, including the eliciting situation, attention, appraisals, subjec-
tive experience, behavior, or physiology.”). 
 244 Gross, supra note 243, at 224–26; Maroney, supra note 222, at 1505–08; Maroney & Gross, 
supra note 49, at 144–46. 
 245 Rueda, supra note 165, at 145; see Mary K. Rothbart & Brad E. Sheese, Temperament and 
Emotion Regulation, in HANDBOOK OF EMOTION REGULATION 331, 336 (James J. Gross ed., 2007) 
(defining “effortful control” as “the ability to inhibit a dominant response in order to perform a sub-
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variation in ability to shape emotional experiences, the thoughts underlying 
them, and the actions they motivate, by focusing, moving, and sustaining atten-
tion; overriding initial or dominant responses in favor of secondary or subdom-
inant ones; and activating a behavior despite a desire to avoid it.246 A common 
analogy is that emotional reactivity is the accelerator and self-regulation the 
brake. Less simplistically, self-regulation encompasses the entire range of ac-
tions one might take to determine a car’s accelerated movements, including 
steering, downshifting, speeding up, and braking.247 
Self-regulatory tendencies—true to type for a core temperamental ele-
ment—emerge early, tend to persist, hold cross-culturally, have genetic and 
neural correlates, tie into core features of a mature personality, and admit of 
significant individual differences.248 Persons high in self-regulation are able to 
display a variety of responses to a range of situations, allowing greater deci-
sional leeway to—for example—approach situations they fear and inhibit ac-
tions they desire, when necessary to meet their short and long-term goals.249 
Such ability is considered a hallmark of emotional intelligence.250 Persons low 
on this trait dimension tend to rely unreflectively on a narrow set of responses 
and frequently deploy less-advantageous avoidant coping mechanisms.251 
These differential regulatory patterns have predictably differential impacts on 
                                                                                                                           
dominant response, to plan, and to detect errors”). The closely related concept of executive attention 
concerns itself with flexible control of cognition, while temperament concerns itself with regulation of 
emotion. As emotion is connected to both thoughts and behavior, a focus on the former includes atten-
tion to the latter. Rueda, supra note 165, at 147; see Rothbart, supra note 32, at 9, 13.  
 246 Rueda, supra note 165, at 145–47. 
 247 In the psychological literature, regulatory dimensions of temperament sometimes are labeled 
“effortful control” and “constraint.” Depue & Fu, supra note 182, at 388; Rueda, supra note 165, at 
145; see also Zentner & Shiner, supra note 32, at 677 tbl.32.1 (finding effortful control to be among 
the most enduring trait dimensions). 
 248 See Lengua & Wachs, supra note 32, at 524–25 (describing how the regulatory domain pre-
disposes people to “utilize specific appraisal, coping, or emotional regulation strategies to deal with 
stress” and “demands”); Kimberly J. Saudino & Manjie Wang, Quantitative and Molecular Genetic 
Studies of Temperament, in HANDBOOK OF TEMPERAMENT, supra note 32, at 315, 317 (explaining the 
genetic components of emotional regulation). 
 249 Rueda, supra note 165, at 145–47; see Lauren K. White et al., Neurobiology and Neurochem-
istry of Temperament in Children, in HANDBOOK OF TEMPERAMENT, supra note 32, at 347, 352–59 
(finding that effective regulation calls on both automatic and “higher-order executive processes” to 
ascertain the nature of a challenge and deploy situationally appropriate attentional and behavioral 
responses). 
 250 Nicola S. Schutte et al., Antecedent-Focused Emotion Regulation, Response Modulation and 
Well-Being, 28 CURRENT PSYCHOL. 21, 23 (2009) (citing John D. Mayer et al., Emotional Intelli-
gence: Theory, Findings, and Implications, 15 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 197, 197–215 (2004)). 
 251 Rueda, supra note 165, at 147; see Depue & Fu, supra note 182, at 389 fig.18.6 (showing the 
interaction between emotionality and constraint); Nancy Eisenberg et al., Effortful Control and Its 
Socioemotional Consequences, in HANDBOOK OF EMOTION REGULATION, supra note 245, at 287, 295 
(finding that persons who are neither “overcontrolled nor undercontrolled” are “well adjusted, socially 
competent, and resilient”). 
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situational success, well-being, and overall adjustment to life demands, includ-
ing work demands.252 
Strength in flexible, active self-regulation is another element of human 
temperament that should be recognized as an essential part of a good judicial 
temperament.253 This trait directly promotes several high-consensus desirable 
behaviors, specifically displays of patience, calm, and a dignified demeanor, 
even in challenging circumstances, and even when such displays are unex-
pected due to a contrasting internal state. As the prior subsection proposed,254 
one way to maximize chances that a judge consistently will display such be-
haviors is to select those with relatively high levels of positive emotionality, 
particularly of the low-arousal sort. A second, complimentary way to do so is 
to preference judges high in self-regulation.255 
Even dispositionally well-regulated judges, however, will have their regu-
latory skills tested by the recurrent challenges of judging. Those challenges do 
not require uniform down-regulation of emotion, but rather nimble shaping and 
switching. It is important for a judge to refrain from showing emotion on her 
face in some situations (for example, to prevent a jury from seeing that she 
thinks a witness is stretching the truth) but to show it in others (for instance, to 
express enthusiasm for a defendant’s progress in reentry court).256 A patient, 
slow, even-toned response is not appropriate when an immediate danger pre-
sents itself, such as a lawyer starting to reference inadmissible material. A 
judge may want to adopt a caring, soothing tone with a frightened child wit-
ness, but a clinical, cold one with an expert witness who refuses to stay on 
task.257 A difficult telephone call with a colleague may de-escalate a conflict, 
whereas the sharply-worded email that was satisfying to draft and easy to send 
may do the opposite. Further, regulatory strategies differentially consume cog-
                                                                                                                           
 252 See Lengua & Wachs, supra note 32, at 524–25 (referencing regulatory variance in children); 
Rothbart & Sheese, supra note 245, at 331–33 (outlining the relationship between temperament and 
emotion regulation across the life span). 
 253 Cf. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 31, at 29 (deeming “[e]motional [i]ntelligence,” defined as 
“[t]he capacity to perceive and manage one’s own emotions and the emotions of others,” a necessary 
judicial attribute). 
 254 See supra notes 172–242 and accompanying text. 
 255 A third way, discussed briefly at the end of this Part, is to train judges explicitly to develop 
their emotion-regulation skills in the unique contexts of their work settings and demands. See NAT’L 
CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 231, at 19–20 (reflecting judicial leaders’ view that their peers 
vary greatly on such emotional management skills—indeed, that emotion regulation is among the sites 
of greatest variance—and need training). Although training would not be expected to change an un-
derlying trait, it would maximize potential for growth within the envelope of possibility, the parame-
ters of which may be larger than assumed. This author has been offering such trainings for some time, 
and is working toward an experimental model to see if regulatory growth can be quantified. 
 256 Maroney, supra note 222, at 1552–54. 
 257 ANLEU & MACK, supra note 150, at 120–22 (identifying five distinct styles of demeanor, 
ranging from welcoming to rude, that judges may use in different situations). 
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nitive resources, and therefore call for differential deployment according to 
whether such resources are abundant or constrained.258 Moreover, although 
judging presents constant regulatory demands, regulatory burdens are not equi-
tably distributed. For example, female judges may find their authority eroded by 
even well-justified and dignified anger displays, even as male judges may find 
their authority cemented.259 Such disparities add to the already significant load 
of self-regulation.260 Self-regulation is a sophisticated improvisational dance, not 
one performed by stepping in numbered outlines on the floor. Every judge needs 
a moderate to high level of regulatory skill to pull off this dance.261 
As with other trait dimensions, regulatory skill exists along a continuum. 
That is to say, it does not have an on-off switch. Those with other substantive 
traits most neatly aligned with core aspects of a good judicial temperament—
positivity, particularly the low-arousal kind, and kindness—would be predicted 
to need slightly lower levels of regulatory skill than their opposing counter-
parts. As less inherently advantageous trait dimensions—the anger/irritation/
frustration/contempt cluster, fear and anxiety, and extraordinarily high levels of 
high-arousal positivity—more regularly tend toward problematic behaviors, 
high regulatory skill will be at a commensurately higher premium. That skill 
would be predicted to make the difference between reacting to a sudden stress-
or with either an explosive outburst or a deep breath, as well as the difference 
between burnout and a long, distinguished career.262 
Judges who come to the bench with strength in the dimension of self-
regulation are therefore relatively good temperamental bets. Those who come 
with less regulatory strength will need considerably more attention. The great-
er the distance between regulatory propensities and behavioral expectations, 
the greater the danger that the judge’s regulatory needs will outpace regulatory 
capacity. Those at the lowest levels of self-regulation may be unsuited for any 
or most judicial assignments. 
                                                                                                                           
 258 See Maroney, supra note 222, at 1545 (explaining that inhibiting facial and bodily signs of 
emotion, for example, imposes cognitive load and memory impairment, whereas changing one’s 
thoughts about a situation in order to change its emotional significance does not). 
 259 Jessica M. Salerno & Liana C. Peter-Hagene, One Angry Woman: Anger Expression Increases 
Influence for Men, but Decreases Influence for Women, During Group Deliberation, 39 L. & HUM. 
BEHAV. 581, 581 (2015). 
 260 See generally Amy S. Wharton, The Sociology of Emotional Labor, 35 ANN. REV. SOC. 147 
(2009) (analyzing scholarship on emotional labor—that is, the work of managing emotions in service 
of workplace norms and demands—and pointing to factors such as gender that affect such labor). 
 261 See Maroney & Gross, supra note 49 (presenting a detailed theoretical model of the emotion-
ally well-regulated judge); Wharton, supra note 260 (highlighting the complexity of emotional labor). 
 262 See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 31, at 29 (asserting that well-regulated judges perceive 
situations more fully, “which leads to a fair and accurate process and sound and fair decisions”; “work 
well under pressure”; “more easily mature and improve in the judicial function”; and make fewer 
mistakes). 
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3. Emotion/Regulation Wheelhouses 
Thus far, this Section has addressed trait-level emotional experience and 
self-regulation as separate. In reality, they are intertwined. Although theoreti-
cally any trait combination is possible, some combinations are more likely than 
others.263 Correlations between patterns of reactivity and regulation create in-
dividual temperamental wheelhouses, and certain wheelhouses are particularly 
common.264 
Those with lesser dispositional regulatory skill tend also to have particu-
larly disadvantageous sorts of trait emotionality. Studies show, for example, 
that adults “who have the highest levels of anger also have the lowest levels of 
cognitive self-regulation.”265 High-trait-anger persons appear particularly like-
ly to have lower skill with effortful control processes that would allow them to 
down-regulate hostile feelings and override impulses toward their behavioral 
expression.266 Strength in the kindness dimension, in contrast, is linked to 
strength in effortful control, including the ability to delay gratification, as well as 
in development of conscience and the associated ability to act on principle.267 
Psychological data, therefore, suggest that some judges will sort into dia-
metrically opposing positions when we look to their wheelhouses. Judges with 
worrisome levels of trait anger, irritation, frustration, and contempt are particu-
larly likely also to engage the least flexible, most harmful forms of emotion 
regulation. Judges with high levels of positive emotionality and kindness are 
particularly likely to engage the most flexible and beneficial forms of regula-
tion. The fact that temperamental dimensions tend to cluster in this way is, in 
                                                                                                                           
 263 Zentner & Shiner, supra note 32, at 680. 
 264 Depue & Fu, supra note 182, at 389. Though this relationship is complex, Depue and Fu pro-
vide a useful matrix in which “emotional trait” occupies the vertical axis and “constraint” the horizon-
tal, each on a continuum from low to high. Id. at 389 fig.18.6. The two tendencies form a diagonal of 
behavioral stability extending from labile (high emotionality and low constraint) to rigid (low emo-
tionality and high constraint). Id. A similar relationship exists between reactivity and any regulatory 
characteristic. See CARVER & SCHEIER, supra note 22, at 35 (observing how “most people do things 
that reflect the entire range of a trait dimension,” but “the things they do most often reflect a narrower 
portion of that dimension”). 
 265 See Deater-Deckard & Wang, supra note 180, at 129 (noting, further, that most people experi-
ence a gradual improvement in “the capacity to regulate negative emotions” throughout adulthood, 
including into “middle age and beyond”). 
 266 Benjamin M. Wilkowski & Michael D. Robinson, The Anatomy of Anger: An Integrative 
Cognitive Model of Trait Anger and Reactive Aggression, 78 J. PERSONALITY 9, 20–24 (2010). The 
consequences of reduced regulatory skill are broad-reaching. A recent meta-analysis makes clear that 
constrained regulatory flexibility and range, as well as use of strategies such as suppression and deni-
al, are associated with poor physical and mental health outcomes, while the opposite is true of flexible 
use of active coping strategies. Bruce E. Compas et al., Coping, Emotion Regulation, and Psycho-
pathology in Childhood and Adolescence: A Meta-Analysis and Narrative Review, 143 PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 939, 965–66 (2017). 
 267 Rueda, supra note 165, at 157. 
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some practical sense, helpful. Slam-dunks and air balls, it appears, will make 
themselves known if we look through the proper lens. Where we see them, we 
should pay heed: the odds of an air ball becoming a slam-dunk are just as low 
as the inverse. 
Understanding the most common wheelhouses might also alert us to dan-
gers where (as often is the case) information is incomplete. When a judge pre-
sents with a documented history of frequent anger displays across different 
situational contexts, including off the bench, we rightly may worry about the 
weak regulatory skill with which the trait underlying such behaviors often is 
packaged. When we see a long history of skillful, context-sensitive emotion 
regulation, we might be more comfortable in assuming that temperamental 
kindness is likely to come along with it. Such assumptions should not be taken 
too far: wheelhouses are typical zones, not automatic ones. Good evidence 
about experiential traits can raise presumptions about self-regulatory ones (and 
vice versa), but the presumption should be tested. 
* * * * 
As this Part has explained, the traits about which we should talk when we 
talk about judicial temperament sound in emotional experience and regulation. 
Psychology supplies a deep explanatory mechanism for why certain substan-
tive qualities—like compassion—are common features on temperament wish-
lists, and why others—like arrogance—occupy the opposite pole. It also vali-
dates our collective instinct that patience, the ability to keep a level head, and 
maintenance of a courteous demeanor are deeply rooted—rooted, as we now 
can see, in self-regulatory dispositions. By ignoring psychological insights 
about a fundamentally psychological construct, we have remained unable to 
theorize why these qualities and behaviors properly are clustered together, and 
to identify where they come from. Perhaps this lacuna arose because under-
standing the construct requires us to traffic outside traditional concepts of legal 
reason and to speak the language of emotion. Law is deeply uncomfortable in 
that space. That is, however, the space we must enter if we aspire for a worka-
ble concept of judicial temperament. 
This Part has revealed, too, that extant accounts have missed certain traits. 
Courage is an important aspect of a good judicial temperament; high trait fear-
fulness and anxiety pull against it. It also has revealed a few surprises. Com-
passion is a critical aspect of judicial temperament not despite its emotional 
nature but because of it. Capacity for flexible emotion regulation is not just a 
helpful skill for judges to cultivate, but a deeply rooted job requirement on 
which judges are likely to vary widely.268 
                                                                                                                           
 268 See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 231, at 4 (noting emotion management as a 
skill critical to judicial excellence but one on which judges vary). 
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Moreover, the insights corralled in this Part can help us feel more san-
guine about the prospect of principled sorting of judges into temperamental 
categories. As particularly advantageous experiential traits tend to come clus-
tered with advantageous self-regulatory ones—and as the opposite also is 
true—we can identify one temperamental prototype that is generally likely to 
be ill-suited to any sort of judging and another that is likely to be well-suited to 
most. Between these poles, we should examine unique combinations of tem-
peramental dimensions within any given judge and hold them up against the 
unique attributes of distinct judicial environments. For example, a judge with 
strong high-arousal positivity may be more suited to an active trial-court as-
signment than a cloistered appellate one. That judge, however, will also need 
particularly strong regulatory skill to nimbly navigate constant interaction with 
lawyers, litigants, juries, and the public without being sidelined by irritation 
and frustration. Such goodness of fit analysis will help us discern the best and 
worst bets for exhibiting preferred judicial behaviors in the predictable param-
eters of that environment. 
The insights undergirding the psycho-legal theory of judicial tempera-
ment also have implications for efforts to support judges’ optimal growth with-
in their envelope of possibility. Regulatory capacity is perhaps the best target 
for such efforts. Sufficient skill in emotion management can mitigate the nega-
tive behavioral expressions of even entrenched reactivity patterns, and the lat-
ter may be harder to dislodge. Regulatory capacity often continues to grow 
over the life span. Though by adulthood growth trajectories are nowhere near 
as malleable as they were in childhood, they never are completely fixed.269 
Interventions in teaching regulatory skill have shown great promise in other 
professional populations, particularly medical professionals, though they have 
not yet been tested with judges.270 To be sure, the weaker the dispositional reg-
ulatory skill and the more emotionally provocative the judge’s typical work 
environment, the less likely it is that any such change will be dramatic.271 We 
therefore would do well to invest primarily in judges high in trait self-
                                                                                                                           
 269 See White et al., supra note 249, at 352–53 (showing that cognitive regulation is strongly 
associated with age, but changes the most in early childhood). 
 270 Maroney, supra note 222, at 1521 (citing to, inter alia, Daisy Grewal & Heather A. Davidson, 
Emotional Intelligence and Graduate Medical Education, 300 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1200 (2008)). See 
generally Rachel A. Cameron et al., In Search of Compassion: A New Taxonomy of Compassionate 
Physician Behaviors, 18 HEALTH EXPECTATIONS 1672 (2015) (observing effective interventions in 
the medical field); Leeat Granek et al., Nature and Impact of Grief Over Patient Loss on Oncologists’ 
Personal and Professional Lives, 172 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 964 (2012) (presenting novel evi-
dence of grief among oncologists, with impacts on both them and their work, and articulating need for 
education for doctors “on how to manage difficult emotions”). 
 271 See Rueda, supra note 165, at 147 (stating that regulatory efficiency depends in part on the 
strength of the emotional processes against which effort is exerted). 
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regulation.272 We should not presume, however, to know the limits of any given 
judge’s envelope of regulatory possibility, which may surprise. Further, because 
many judges already on the bench will display relative regulatory weakness—
given that we have not systematically selected them with this trait in mind—and 
because the demands of judging require even those with regulatory strength to 
become stronger, programs to increase regulatory skill always will add val-
ue.273  
Of course, judges with the least advantageous temperamental wheelhouse 
are already on the bench. Accordingly, we should be realistic about the level of 
intervention that may be needed to have a chance of moving them into ac-
ceptable territory—and the fact that they may never get there even with interven-
tion. Moreover, our lack of a solid theoretical foundation has prevented us from 
knowing what effective interventions might even look like. The more we are 
able to develop such interventions for a diverse array of judges and judging envi-
ronments, the more we can be confident in concluding that any given judge, 
having failed to improve even with intervention, is irreparably unfit. 
The psycho-legal theory thus buttresses, sharpens, and expands upon our 
core instincts about judicial temperament. The temperamental slice of desired 
judicial attitudes and behaviors does indeed have deep roots in the person. 
Temperaments can be trained and shaped, but are not infinitely malleable. 
Even when our only data source is evidence of these traits in different do-
mains, such as in private life or non-judicial work, those data should be taken 
seriously as predictors of judicial behavior, if those domains share relevant 
features with the judging environment. If used as the starting point for a robust 
research program, the theory promises to materially improve our use of judi-
cial temperament as a guide for selecting, sorting, and supporting judges. 
III. WHAT WE OUGHT NOT TALK ABOUT WHEN WE  
TALK ABOUT JUDICIAL TEMPERAMENT 
The research supporting the psycho-legal theory of judicial temperament 
exposes the unduly narrow scope of accounts like Solum’s, which singles out 
just one relevant emotional trait.274 It similarly reveals the overbreadth of ac-
counts like Rosen’s,275 which folds in every aspect of a judge’s personal life 
and judicial philosophy. Providing a principled basis for distinguishing tem-
                                                                                                                           
 272 Maroney, supra note 222, at 1555 & n.395 (suggesting that “extraordinary” judges who regu-
late emotion well, doing “naturally what we tell them not to do” and achieving “privately what we 
discourage publicly,” “perhaps” are the ones “we think of as having a good judicial ‘temperament,’ an 
oft-invoked but profoundly underspecified quality”). 
 273 Id. 
 274 See supra notes 71–78 and accompanying text.  
 275 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.  
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peramental factors from everything else a judge brings to the bench forces us 
into more specific and disciplined discourse. It prevents us from using temper-
ament as either a smoke screen or conceptual dumping ground. 
As this Part explains, the psycho-legal theory helps us see what desirable 
judicial traits are not temperamental.276 This Part further warns against falling 
into common fallacies that have plagued former discourse on human tempera-
ment.277 Moreover, specifying the complexity of judicial temperament cautions 
us against adopting simplistic formulae for assessing it.  
A. Not All Desirable Judicial Traits Are Temperamental 
As we have seen, one important aspect of delineating what judicial temper-
ament is is to clarify what it is not—not just by reference to that which is opposi-
tional, but also to that which is orthogonal. Psychological research strongly sup-
ports accounts like that of the ABA Standing Committee guidelines, which dis-
tinguish temperament from the judicial qualities of integrity and professional 
competence.278 Surely this is correct. Even the most temperamentally ideal per-
son would be a terrible judge if she had no ethical barometer or deeply subpar 
legal training and skills. The psycho-legal theory of judicial temperament, how-
ever, also reveals a particularly important way in which even the best-supported 
accounts have gotten it wrong. The ABA Standing Committee guidelines, like a 
number of others, include in their temperamental construct “freedom from bias” 
and “commitment to equal justice under the law.”279 Declarative commitments to 
equality are not temperamental, but rather land squarely in the domain of abili-
ties and beliefs—important, but lacking all the temperamental hallmarks such as 
heritability and durability.280 Commitment to equality—for example, along lines 
of race, sex and gender, sexual orientation, disability, and nationality—is a high 
order, culturally specific set of thoughts, beliefs, and values. So too is the belief 
that the good society is one in which such multiple forms of human existence are 
to be encouraged even when they are not one’s own—indeed, even when we do 
not fully understand or endorse them. Such thoughts, beliefs, and values are an 
                                                                                                                           
 276 See infra notes 278–285 and accompanying text.  
 277 See infra notes 286–311 and accompanying text. 
 278 HOW IT WORKS, supra note 11, at 3. See generally FED. JUDICIAL CTR, supra note 31 (separating 
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 279 HOW IT WORKS, supra note 11, at 3. 
 280 See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
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important aspect of personal identity on which people vary, but they are not 
rooted in temperament.281 
The one sense in which commitments to equality and diversity are tem-
peramental is that they would be predicted to occur somewhat more frequently 
in those who are dispositionally open-minded—a quality that, as we have seen, 
is promoted by trait positive emotionality.282 Open-mindedness creates a space 
within which such commitments might find a home; the commitments fill that 
space with a specific set of ideas. Put differently, it would be difficult for a per-
son to arrive at declarative commitments to equality and diversity without a 
certain quantum of open-mindedness. It is, however, entirely possible not to 
hold such commitments, despite open-mindedness. For example, a person who 
is naturally open to new experiences and learning, but who is never exposed to 
information about people different from her—or who is exposed only to nega-
tive information and judgments about such people—is unlikely to develop 
such commitments. 
A similar point can be made about trait kindness. Naturally high levels of 
empathy, compassion, and prosocial behavior would be expected to make a per-
son more likely to understand and care about the experiences of those unlike her. 
Trait kindness, however, in no way guarantees its extension across salient socie-
tal dividing lines. Ample research shows that we often dole out empathy, com-
passion, and prosocial behaviors more frequently to people whom we regard as 
“like us.”283 What sorts of persons one regards as within that zone—whether 
explicitly or implicitly—depends on one’s thoughts and beliefs about dissimilar 
persons. A committed racist may exhibit enormous empathy and care for those 
within his racial group and their exact opposite outside of it. A white person who 
has developed a heartfelt commitment to anti-racist ideals might remain firmly 
opposed to all forms of equal treatment for lesbian and gay persons. A judge 
might act on an instinctive empathy for a defendant who reminds him of himself 
twenty years prior, but feel no such connection to a defendant of a different gen-
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CHOL. BULL. 497, 506 (2000) (finding people more willing to volunteer for people they identified as 
their own group).  
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der, race, or class—or even one who went to a different college. Emotional dis-
positions do not create declarative beliefs or override implicit biases. Rather, 
they are channeled and bounded by them. 
Accordingly, declarative commitments to equality and diversity should be 
understood as an aspect not of temperament but of ideology. Packing such 
commitments within the domain of judicial temperament is a particularly con-
sequential example of the conceptual slippage that bedevils extant accounts. 
Consider that the ABA Standing Committee declares philosophy and ideology 
off-limits in its evaluation of judicial nominees.284 Doing so allows it to pre-
serve its image of political impartiality. Nevertheless, declarative commitments 
to equality and diversity are an important qualification for judicial office in a 
diverse democracy. Because it would be intolerable in the contemporary Unit-
ed States for a committed, overt white supremacist (for example) to be consid-
ered qualified, the ABA has to package commitments to equality and diversity 
somewhere—and temperament is the floppy construct into which these home-
less concepts can be shoved. 
Pulling these commitments out of where they never belonged is im-
portant. Doing so requires us to admit that some aspects of a judge’s ideology 
actually do matter as a condition of entry.285 Explicitly positioning commit-
ments to equality and diversity within ideology, and accepting that at least this 
aspect of ideology is non-negotiable, requires us to articulate explicitly what 
specific set of beliefs and values are unacceptable in a judge, and why; what 
we can and should do actively to inculcate them; and when we collectively can 
conclude that a given person’s antidemocratic values are too ossified to 
change. 
B. Avoiding Caricature and Clumsiness 
The psycho-legal theory of judicial temperament carries implications for se-
lecting judges, sifting them into the environments to which they are temperamen-
tally best suited, supporting the improvement of temperamental baselines through 
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judicial evaluation, counseling, and education, and—finally—establishing bases 
and mechanisms for judicial removal. Every new theory presents new pitfalls, 
however, and this one is no different. Its primary dangers are overdeterminism 
and oversimplification in the move from theory to practice. 
First, any claim about stable categories into which humans reliably can be 
sorted invites reduction to a parlor-game exercise. As Kagan explains: 
Every age has a preferred explanation of the obvious differences 
among people that always are a focus of curiosity and a topic for 
gossip. The most persuasive accounts attribute most of the human 
variation to one causal mechanism, for the mind likes single-process 
explanations over those that involve multiple forces; the latter are 
difficult to grasp and therefore less pleasing.286 
Indeed, Galen’s four-part typology owes no small part of its two-millennia cul-
tural run to its simplicity. The contemporary United States, no longer quite in 
Galen’s sway (and arguably less obsessed with Zodiac signs than we were sev-
eral decades ago), has enthusiastically embraced our own four-part tempera-
mental typology. The four Harry Potter houses—“brave Gryffindor, gentle 
Hufflepuff, smart Ravenclaw or ambitious Slytherin”—have become a popular 
way to capture perceived types.287 Sorting Hat aficionados are making im-
portant life decisions, such as marriage, based on this magic mechanism that 
ostensibly reveals one’s essential, unwavering core. Startlingly, they also are 
seeking to alter their behaviors and habits so they will continue to fit within the 
house in which they are emotionally invested.288 We would do well to be wary 
of the tidy faddishness that so often attends typology. 
Reductionist typology can be not just faddish but dangerous. Those dan-
gers are perhaps most obvious when typology explicitly incorporates bodily 
attributes. As the pioneering theorists Sheldon and Stevens put it more than 
half a century ago: 
Tradition has it that fat men are jolly and generous, that lean mean 
are dour, that short men are aggressive, and that strong men are si-
lent and confident. But tradition is sometimes wise and sometimes 
stupid, for seldom does it distinguish between the accumulated wis-
dom of the ages and the superstitions of ignorance. Especially as re-
gards physique and temperament have the conclusions of careful 
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2020] Judicial Temperament 2143 
students been contaminated by the stereotypes of the street and by 
the dogmatism of the side-show phrenologist.289 
The references to stereotype and phrenology drive home the point that not all 
temperamental typologies are whimsical or potentially benign. Consider the 
work of Lorenzo and Lydia Fowler, well-known late-nineteenth-century phre-
nologists who were equally evangelistic about temperament.290 The Fowlers’ 
work was stunningly specific in purporting to link nationality and physical at-
tributes—particularly those associated with racial and gender difference—to 
stable mental and emotional traits, which they then mapped onto suitability for 
particular sorts of work.291 The end result were assessments like this one: Afri-
cans have lower brain volume than Europeans; boast “more memory and pow-
er of observation than originality of thought”; and show little development of 
the “moral brain” while having a large “social brain,” coupled with low “self-
esteem,” qualities that together render them more easily enslaved.292 The 
Fowlers fed to rapt audiences similar evaluations of the inherent traits and op-
timal work roles of, among others, Jews, Native Americans, white women, 
Scots, Poles, and the French. Although their work is an extreme example of 
how distorted ideas can shape temperamental classification and the nefarious 
ends to which such classification can be put, the Fowlers were not alone. Even 
Sheldon and Stevens, while decrying such tendencies, made generalizations 
about the temperamental attributes of Jews and “Negroes.”293 
We have a responsibility in our own time to ensure that taking tempera-
ment seriously does not provide cover for reductionism. This would be an eas-
ier task if adult temperament—the trait dimensions themselves, the specific 
ways in which they express in observable behaviors, and the ways in which we 
assess them—were cleanly separable from social and cultural influences. This 
is not the case. First, as we have seen, environment and life experience shape 
temperament’s development within the envelope of possibility.294 Socially sali-
ent categorizations such as race, class, and gender, as well as exposure to par-
ticular stressors such as poverty and war, are aspects of environment and life 
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experience.295 This reality underscores the importance of being open to tem-
peramental diversity above baselines. We would not, for example, want to treat 
dispositional fearfulness at any level as disqualifying. Not only would such a 
practice violate the theory’s requirement that we evaluate traits in their full 
context, it would disadvantage judges in whom that trait reflects childhood 
adversity and advantage judges who have been privileged enough to escape 
such adversity. The greater degree to which we embrace temperamental diver-
sity, the greater degree to which we embrace human diversity. 
Second, culture shapes emotion expression and regulation in ways not at-
tributable to temperament.296 Swedish judges, for example, operate within a 
national culture that highly values subdued emotional displays. When they 
wish to convey anger or irritation toward a long-winded lawyer, they do so by 
quietly putting down their pens.297 That signal would be utterly lost in a differ-
ent cultural context. More importantly, it is not indicative of any particular 
temperamental trait but, rather, of the judges’ internalization of cultural norms 
for how these emotions properly are displayed. Similarly, women generally 
experience anger about as much as men do, but tend to express it differently—
for example, engaging in fewer overt displays of aggression—because of gen-
dered acculturation to distinct behavioral expectations.298 Outside observers 
thus may mistake differential display patterns for reliable signs of a person’s 
underlying temperament constellation. Furthermore, they may do so in a bi-
ased fashion, reflecting implicit assumptions about what behaviors are normal 
or abnormal for a given type of person.299 
Some have made this case with regard to Senator Lindsey Graham’s dif-
ferential temperamental assessments of Justices Sotomayor and Kavanaugh. At 
Sotomayor’s confirmation hearing, he quoted anonymous lawyers who de-
                                                                                                                           
 295 Jerome Kagan, The Bases for Preservation of Emotional Biases, in THE NATURE OF EMOTION, 
supra note 167, at 64, 65–66; see Xinyin Chen at al., Culture and Temperament, in HANDBOOK OF 
TEMPERAMENT, supra note 32, at 462, 462–74 (exploring evidence of cultural differences in reactivi-
ty and regulation, and possible explanations, including exposure to daily stresses); Nicole M. Else-
Quest, Gender Differences in Temperament, in HANDBOOK OF TEMPERAMENT, supra note 32, at 479, 
479–92 (finding that gender impacts temperamental development and expression, though mechanisms 
are unclear, and that “males and females are similar on most but not all psychological behaviors, 
traits, and abilities”). 
 296 Batja Mesquita & Dustin Albert, The Cultural Regulation of Emotions, in HANDBOOK OF 
EMOTION REGULATION, supra note 245, at 486, 496–503; Fraser Watts, Emotion Regulation and 
Religion, in HANDBOOK OF EMOTION REGULATION, supra note 245, at 504, 504–20. 
 297 Bergman Blix & Wettergren, supra note 224, at 35. 
 298 See Deater-Deckard & Wang, supra note 180, at 133 (observing few if any sex differences or 
cross-cultural variations in anger traits, though culture and gender norms influence whether and how 
dispositional anger is displayed); Else-Quest, supra note 295, at 488–89 (noting impact of gender 
socialization and stereotyping). 
 299 See Else-Quest, supra note 295, at 485–86 (identifying the risk that those perceiving behaviors 
will interpret and respond to them differently based on gender). 
2020] Judicial Temperament 2145 
scribed her as “excitable,” “angry,” “aggressive,” and “nasty,” and suggested 
that she examine her temperament problem.300 Following Kavanaugh’s dra-
matic display of anger at his confirmation hearing, in contrast, Graham raised 
no such concerns and rallied behind that display.301 This distinction revived 
objections of a race- and gender-based double standard.302 The specifics of that 
contrast can be (and surely will continue to be) debated. It is true, however, 
that in evaluating judges’ temperament we run the risk of invoking taken-for-
granted standards that could lionize affective styles associated with particular 
social, experiential, and cultural backgrounds, while demonizing others.303 In 
Kagan’s words, a society that seeks to enshrine differences in order to exert 
hierarchical control will find it expedient to freeze human qualities into catego-
ries that serve that goal.304 
The proper response to deeply bad science that has been put to deeply bad 
uses, and to the human biases that influence how even good science is used, is 
not to stop investigating the scientific target and making use of what we 
learn.305 Indeed, taking the science of temperament seriously is our best bet for 
avoiding the dangers of reductionism. The unguided “common sense” of any 
given group of decisionmakers—the kind of folk wisdom that has driven tem-
peramental assessment to date—is appealing in its simplicity, but it necessarily 
reflects a situated set of often-unwarranted assumptions and blind spots.306 The 
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psycho-legal theory of judicial temperament provides grounded tools for un-
derstanding a complex reality. It orients us away from potentially biased sur-
face evaluation and toward deep sources. The evil specter, though, and even 
the silly one, does require us to proceed with great care. 
Finally, going beyond that which is silly or evil, making a good theory 
operational can be clunky. An instructive example comes from corporate per-
sonality testing. It has become common for U.S. corporations to make hiring, 
firing, work assignment, and promotional decisions based on personality 
measurement tools, many of which use the well-validated Big Five criteria.307 
Indeed, a large industry supports this practice, the big idea of which is essen-
tially the same as that behind the pen-and-paper vocational aptitude tests given 
to generations of junior high school students. That big idea is, basically, good-
ness-of-fit thinking. Just like those seventh-grade tests that said you would be a 
great firefighter or entertainer, however, the practice is highly imperfect. Even 
where tools accurately measure the personality factors of interest, the impact 
of those factors on work performance varies—for example, by the specific sort 
of work, levels of worker autonomy, how work teams operate, reward struc-
tures, and degrees of work stress.308 Personality testing has also raised con-
cerns about distortion of diversity goals, perhaps because of biases built into 
the tools themselves.309 
No matter how the psycho-legal theory of judicial temperament is opera-
tionalized, simple reliance on a single assessment tool is highly unlikely to be 
appropriate. Single-shot assessment of supposedly fixed qualities of people so 
as to slot them into predetermined work roles oversimplifies a complex human 
reality. It also can draw attention away from a wider universe of options—such 
as seeking to enhance growth in needed qualities, and altering work environ-
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ments so as to incentivize and facilitate desired behaviors. Indeed, the corpo-
rate world is now broadening its assessment norms with these concerns in 
mind, both seeking multiple perspectives on employees’ attributes and examin-
ing those perspectives in light of fit with individualized work expectations.310 
This trend mirrors a similar one in actuarial assessments of legally-relevant 
behavior, such as recidivism risk. Increasingly, such tools are being conceptual-
ized as risk-and-needs assessments, capturing relevant indicators in a way that—
first—outperforms individual human judgment, and—second—can guide human 
judgment, with the objective of matching any given person with the level and 
kind of supervision and services that will minimize her risk and maximize her 
chances of thriving.311 A successful operationalization of the psycho-legal theory 
likely will reflect the spirit of this turn. Temperamental assessment tools could 
be designed to identify any given judge’s areas of strength, obstacles to judicial 
success, and supports needed to improve professional outcomes. 
This Part has thus far flagged danger zones as we consider how the psycho-
legal theory of judicial temperament may be leveraged to catalyze practical ad-
vances. It has not tried to solve these issues, as it would be ill-advised to jump 
quickly from theoretical framing to operational utility. What is called for is a 
careful empirical research program to test, refine, and potentially alter the theory 
itself, and then consider, with rigor, how to systematically transform processes of 
judicial selection, training, support, evaluation, discipline, and removal to take 
better account of what the theory reveals about judicial temperament. 
IV. REIMAGINING 2018 IN LIGHT OF THE PSYCHO-LEGAL  
THEORY: A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT 
The 2018 debate over Justice Kavanaugh’s temperament, with which this 
Article began, represents a dramatically squandered opportunity to engage in a 
principled public conversation about judicial temperament.312 One initial 
measure of the psycho-legal theory’s value, then, is the extent to which it could 
have informed that debate. If its conceptual framework could have sharpened 
collective understanding of the aspect of the controversy that was actually 
                                                                                                                           
 310 David W. Bracken & Allen H. Church, The “New” Performance Management Paradigm: 
Capitalizing on the Unrealized Potential of 360 Degree Feedback, PEOPLE & STRATEGY, June 2013, 
at 34, 39. 
 311 See, e.g., MARK W. LIPSEY ET AL., CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM, IMPROVING THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE PROGRAMS: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON EVIDENCE-BASED 
PRACTICE 22–27 (2010); PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, RISK/NEEDS ASSESSMENT 101: SCIENCE RE-
VEALS NEW TOOLS TO MANAGE OFFENDERS 1 (2011), https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/
uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2011/pewriskassessmentbriefpdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/LP8P-J42G]. 
 312 Indeed, the theory has already been cited as a useful intellectual framework for organizing that 
debate. Robert Barnes, Questions Linger About Nominee’s Judicial Temperament, WASH. POST, Oct. 
6, 2018, at A5. 
2148 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:2085 
about temperament, and if it could have facilitated reasoned dialogue about 
that aspect in a shared, empirically-grounded language that avoided reduction-
ism, then this important moment in U.S. judicial history might have thrown off 
more light than heat. 
This is a tall order, given the complicated and potent mix of other consid-
erations simultaneously at play in the Kavanaugh nomination. The most obvi-
ous such consideration was the truth or falsity of sexual assault and harassment 
allegations, on which it is not useful here to opine. Their truth or falsity was 
relevant, but in a unidirectional way. If they were true and known to Ka-
vanaugh to be true, then no portion of his behavior at the hearing was defensi-
ble, whether as a matter of temperament or of integrity. If they were not true, 
or if they were not known by Kavanaugh to be true (or if he was unaware of a 
significant risk that they might be true and that he might be unable to recall the 
events), however, the temperamental debate is legitimate, but complicated. 
Without offering an opinion on the ultimate answer to that debate—which 
would be speculative—the psycho-legal theory does clarify the terms with 
which we should have had it. 
Take as a starting proposition that then-Judge Kavanaugh’s emotional 
displays at the hearing, which included clear expressions of anger, frustration, 
and contempt, were highly unusual and counter-normative for that formal, pub-
lic, and consequential setting. On this, there is wide consensus.313 From there 
opinion forked in two general directions. Detractors saw the extreme display of 
negative emotion as indicative of destructive traits that Kavanaugh generally is 
able to keep under wraps, but that had been revealed by the extreme pressures 
of the situation.314 Defenders cast that display as an appropriate episodic re-
sponse to an extraordinary situation that was unlikely to recur, certainly not in 
a work setting, and thus as diagnostic only of the depth of his legitimate self-
regard and care for his family.315 
The psycho-legal theory contemplates that either narrative could be 
true—for example, because behavior under stress can be revealing of temper-
ament, but can also be aberrational. The behavior itself is not a conclusive in-
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dicator of the source from which it springs. In determining which view was 
more likely to be accurate, the psycho-legal theory would have counseled ex-
amination of, among other things: past, documented incidents of similar be-
havior in similarly stressful, or less stressful, situations; the lack of such be-
havior in similarly stressful, or more stressful, situations; and the extent to 
which environmental factors may have facilitated or constrained our access to 
direct evidence of such behaviors (for example, in the generally cloistered 
world of appellate chambers). As the primary concern was with Kavanaugh’s 
displays of negative emotion, we might also have looked for reliable, con-
sistent signs of positive emotionality and kindness, including in trying circum-
stances, with which trait negative emotionality tends not to be clustered. If 
such evidence was muted or absent, a move from negative behaviors to nega-
tive trait might be more supportable, and if it was present (particularly at high 
levels and across meaningfully varied situations), that move would be less so. 
The psycho-legal theory of judicial temperament would have also di-
rected separate consideration of available evidence of then-Judge Kavanaugh’s 
relative skill with self-regulation. In making that assessment, it would be rele-
vant to determine whether Kavanaugh deliberately chose to express his nega-
tive emotions as he did. Such a choice would raise concerns not about his regu-
latory capacity but, rather, the normative status of the reasons for making that 
choice.316 If, instead, his actions reflected dysregulation—that is, inability to 
conform to his valued norms—then our concern would be not only the norma-
tive content of the ideas he expressed but also the extent to which the episode 
could be indicative of deep-seated regulatory deficits. Evidence about his typi-
cal regulatory skill and default emotion-regulation strategies then would have 
become highly relevant.317 One also ought to have asked whether the predicta-
ble demands of serving on the Supreme Court of the United States would cre-
ate new situations that, although about profoundly different things, might cause 
regulatory demands to exceed Kavanaugh’s regulatory capacity. If that was 
likely to be true, one would have wanted to ask whether the Court’s culture, 
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norms, and constraints would sufficiently cabin the impact—on the Justice, on 
his colleagues, on cases, and on the public image of the Court—of instances of 
self-regulatory failure. 
Some of these factors were indeed in play during the confirmation de-
bates. For example, Kavanaugh’s supporters pointed to his lengthy tenure in 
judicial service without temperamental complaint.318 Detractors called atten-
tion to other alleged episodes of dysregulated anger and aggressive behavior.319 
Even these relevant points were unable to be fully developed, however, given 
how quickly they became intertwined with positions on truth or falsity of the 
assault and harassment allegations.320 Legitimate temperamental arguments 
quickly were cast as positions taken by warring camps, not as sensitive, com-
plicated matters calling for thorough and sensitive public dialogue.321 
Further, the ways in which people largely talked past one another on the 
issue of temperament muddied an independently important conversation about 
ideology.322 It was not just then-Judge Kavanaugh’s emotional expressions that 
were extraordinary.323 So too was his overt invocation of political partisanship. 
Some of his words and actions reasonably could have been interpreted not just 
as a (potentially justified) complaint that he was being victimized by such par-
tisanship, but also as a declaration that he personally identified in an explicitly 
partisan manner and would continue to do so on the Court.324 Like commit-
                                                                                                                           
 318 Hatch, supra note 4 (stating that the judge’s “critics seem to be aghast that he is a human be-
ing who is unwilling to take slander lying down,” and that “this whole ‘temperament’ argument is a 
non sequitur” given that the ABA report showed that “[l]awyers and judges overwhelmingly praised 
Judge Kavanaugh’s judicial temperament”); Ventresca, supra note 4. Some commentators also made 
at least rudimentary goodness-of-fit arguments. See Michael Barone, Opinion, It’s OK for Judges to 
Be Angry, WASH. EXAMINER (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion
/michael-barone-its-okay-for-judges-to-be-angry [https://perma.cc/9CJ2-TCJQ] (stating the im-
portance of judicial temperament for trial judges, but asserting that “[a]ppeals courts can function 
tolerably well even with very nasty judges”); Ruben Navarrette, Jr., Opinion, Kavanaugh’s Emotions 
Showed He’s Human. That’s a Good Thing in a Supreme Court Justice., USA TODAY (Oct. 18, 2018), 
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testimony-shows-human-column/1662723002/ [https://perma.cc/8XPA-WN6Q] (asserting that the 
“left” is trying to “‘get’ Kavanaugh” on temperament, but that he likes a judge “with an emotional 
streak” and comparing Kavanaugh to the state-court judge who sentenced Larry Nasser). 
 319 Judi Hershman, I’ll Never Forget Brett Kavanaugh’s Anger, SLATE (Nov. 5, 2018), https://
slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/11/brett-kavanaugh-ken-starr-heidi-heitkamp-republican-campaign-
democrat.html [https://perma.cc/5ZC5-7PD2]. 
 320 Id. 
 321 See supra notes 318–319 and accompanying text. 
 322 See supra notes 318–319 and accompanying text. 
 323 See The Senate Should Not Confirm Kavanaugh: Signed, 2,400+ Law Professors, supra note 3. 
 324 Barnes, supra note 312 (quoting retired Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens, who was 
sufficiently concerned about the partisan elements of Kavanaugh’s behavior as to counsel senators to 
“really pay attention to it”). Another relevant discussion about beliefs and values might have revolved 
around whether evidence of the nominee’s kindness reliably revealed that kindness to be selective. Cf. 
Lisa Blatt, I’m a Liberal Feminist Lawyer. Here’s Why Democrats Should Support Judge Kavanaugh., 
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ments to equality and diversity, strength of identification with a political party 
is a set of beliefs and values that is both orthogonal to temperament and highly 
relevant to judicial fitness, particularly the duty of impartiality. An extraordi-
narily important debate began to unfold over whether such a display of appar-
ent partisanship revealed beliefs so strong and operational as to signal unfit-
ness—not because of temperament, but because of ideology. That important 
debate, however, was partly drowned out by the temperamental morass into 
which it was pitched.325 A less toxic, more grounded set of theoretical ground 
rules might have allowed us to separate these independently critical aspects of 
fitness, and to examine the mainstream position that no aspect of ideology is 
relevant at the judicial selection phase. 
This discussion of the Kavanaugh nomination will not harmonize pas-
sionately held positions, nor is it meant to. It does demonstrate that a psycho-
logically grounded dialogue about temperament would have maximized poten-
tial to talk with one another and not past one another. The lack of a shared the-
ory and vocabulary made it difficult to have a conversation that did anything 
but sharpen division, and conceptual slippage made it difficult to untangle 
temperament from the other considerations at play. Unfortunately, public de-
bate over U.S. Supreme Court nominations in highly polarized political times 
may prove impervious to even the most compelling theory. One hopes that this 
is not the case. But even if this is so, the dialogue-disciplining potential of the 
psycho-legal theory presumably will be greater in the much larger, less public, 
and less politicized determinations of temperamental fitness happening every 
day across the country. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has offered a psycho-legal theory of judicial temperament to 
replace the ill-defined ones of our past and present. That theory proposes that, 
                                                                                                                           
POLITICO (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/08/02/im-a-liberal-feminist-
heres-why-i-support-judge-kavanaugh-219081 [https://perma.cc/SH7H-62HL] (“Kavanaugh is a great 
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far from being either a mystical quality or one that can be captured with a 
back-of-the-envelope inventory, judicial temperament is a complex but coher-
ent construct, one deeply harmonious with psychological concepts of human 
development. How well or poorly a particular judge lives up to the tempera-
mental expectations of judicial office depends to no small degree on his or her 
tendencies toward particular patterns of emotional experience and regulation. 
These tendencies are deep. They are, by adulthood, only imperfectly malleable. 
They drive behavior, particularly in the stressful situations that typify most 
forms of judging. The behaviors we most want from our judges are rooted in a 
tendency to feel positive emotions such as satisfaction and joy; a strong dispo-
sition for empathy, compassion, and prosocial action; and facility with shaping 
emotions and their expression in service of the proximate and distal goals of 
judging. The behaviors we least want from our judges are rooted in a tendency 
to feel negative emotions such as anger and fear; low dispositional kindness; 
and a rigid, constrained regulatory repertoire. Judges will present with a range 
of temperamental constellations, only some of which will be at the extremes of 
ideal or disqualifying. A judge’s temperamental wheelhouse—that is, the as-
pects of their trait constellation that most habitually find expression in behav-
ior—is an important determinant of the kinds of judicial assignments to which 
she will be best or worst suited. It also is an important determinant of the kinds 
of training and support that will both minimize any risk she poses to the reality 
and perception of justice, and maximize her chances of personal and profes-
sional flourishing. The psycho-legal theory also urges that courage be recog-
nized as an aspect of judicial temperament, and that commitments to equality 
and diversity instead be recognized as an aspect of ideology. Finally, it cau-
tions care in further theoretical development and in moving from theory to im-
plementation. 
This new theory of judicial temperament stands up well as a theory. A 
theory should, first, explain. This one explains why we have persisted in our 
belief in the existence and importance of something called judicial tempera-
ment, despite our equally persistent inability to get our arms around it. The 
belief persists because it reflects a deep truth about human beings. Our inabil-
ity to get our arms around judicial temperament has, until now, persisted be-
cause we have failed to plumb available insights from our sister discipline of 
psychology. That inability also reflects our reluctance to face judicial temper-
ament’s emotional core. 
A theory should also predict, a function “more subtle and more diffi-
cult.”326 This one predicts that specific traits will manifest in desirable judicial 
behaviors (or their opposite) in interaction with specific features of diverse 
                                                                                                                           
 326 Carver & Scheier, supra note 22, at 6. 
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judicial environments. These interactions, it asserts, can be empirically cap-
tured, though to date they have not been. The theory further proposes that we 
can, and ought to, develop sound methods for assessing presence or absence of 
the traits that underlie any given judge’s temperamental fitness, both as a gen-
eral matter—that is, whether they clear baselines—and as a specific one—that 
is, to what judicial assignment their temperament is best suited. It further pre-
dicts that we can improve many (perhaps most) judges’ emotional regulation 
skills with adequate investment. Whether these predictions hold true will be 
shown over time, as this new theory is probed, argued with, and tested. The it-
erative process this Article hopes to spur will meaningfully enhance our collec-
tive understanding of this critical aspect of judicial fitness—and, ultimately, our 
ability to operationalize that understanding through valid, reliable processes. 
This effort is worth it. The quality of justice depends heavily on the quali-
ty of those who dispense it, and that depends heavily on temperament. 
 
 
 
 
